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ABSTRACT
THEORY OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
William H. Oakland
Submitted to the Department of Economics and Social Science on
August 27, 1964, in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics.
In the first chapter we analyze the nature of the value-
added tax and its relationship to other concepts of taxation.
Our analysis in this chapter is carried out under the assump-
tions of a classical full employment economy. We find that the
value-added tax, except in its consumption form, is not a new
tax, but is equivalent to a gross income tax or a net income
tax--depending upon how depreciation is treated. Furthermore,
unless saving is interest-elastic, any form of direct tax
(including the value-added tax) has identical output effects.
In Chapter Two we attempt to determine the relative
incidence effects of a profits tax and a value-added tax within
the context of a classical model. If saving is not highly
interest-elastic and/or the consumption good industry is not
significantly more capital intensive than the capital-good
industry, the distribution of income is more unequal under the
value-added than under the profits tax. This conclusion holds
for both the short-run and the long-run.
In Chapter Three we abandon the classical model in favor
of a Keynesian unemployment model. Our aim is to discover the
short-run stability implications of a shift from a corporate
income tax to a value-added tax. We find that, as long as
the value-added tax is only partially shifted by the firm, the
short-run stability of the economy will be reduced. If the
value-added tax is borne by the factors of production in
proportion to their earnings, however, this conclusion is
reversed.
Chapters Four and Five are devoted to an estimate of the
impact of the tax substitution upon the timing and level of
investment expenditures. Depending upon which set of shifting
assumptions we choose to make investment may increase or
decrease. The more likely case, however, is that investment
will decrease. Finally, in the last chapter we summarize our
findings and make some attempt to appraise the desirability of
substituting a value-added tax for a corporate profits tax.
Our conclusion is that this tax substitution should not be made.
Thesis Supervisor: Albert K. Ando
Title: Associate Professor of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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CHAPTER I
THE VALUE-ADDED TAX AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO OTHER FORMS OF TAXATION
INTRODUCTION
The existing literature on ,the value-added tax is excellent
in its institutional content but is almost devoid of theoretical
analysis. This is a bit surprising since the concept of value-added
taxation is not new-- it was first advanced in 1921 by T.S. Adams.1
However, a thorough theoretical analysis of a tax often follows
its imposition; it is only recently that the value-added tax has
been put into effect.
Before delving into theoretical matters, it would perhaps
be wise to offer a brief description of the history and
development of the concept of value-added taxation. The
original interest in value-added taxation sprung from the
desire for a general sales tax which would avoid the "cascade
feature of a general turnover tax. Under the latter, the amount
of tax borne by any particular final good depends upon the
number of intermediate stages of production which precede it.
Since final products differ in the degree to which they are
lT.S. Adams, 0Fundamental Problems of Federal Income
Taxation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.XXXV (May,1921),
pp. 527-556.
-l-
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vertically integrated, the turnover tax would create a
distortion in the pattern of relative goods prices. This
effect would be offset somewhat since there would be a tendency
for firms to vertically integrate. Since some industries are
vertically integrated more easily than others, this force
could not fully offset the initial distortion in relative
goods prices. A value-added tax on the other hand, is independent
of the degree of vertical intergration within an industry. Each
firm is taxed only on that portion of its final product which
is over and above what it has purchased from other value-added
tax paying units. Hence, final goods will be taxed proportionately
to their selling price; there will result no distortion of
relative goods prices.1
The value-added tax was also thought of as the best form
of business taxation.2 Government, it was argued, is a true
partner in the productive process. Hencela payment which is
proportional to governmental services is necessary in order to
prevent a distortion in the pattern of goods and services produced.
The best index of a firm's use of government services, it was
argued, is its value-added in production. Note, however, that if
this is indeed the case, then the absence of a value-added tax
would not distort the pattern of goods and services.
1This is strictly true only if labor is supplied inelastically
with respect to the real wage. Every tax system (except a lump-
sum tax) will distort the relative price of leisure to other goods.
P. Studenski, OToward a Theory of Business Taxation,'
Journal DI Polictical Economy, Vol. XLVIII (October,1940), pp.621-54i
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The primary interest in the value-added tax during the
twenties and thirties was exhibited in Europe. Because it had
the politically undesirable feature of requiring higher
statuatory rates than a turnover tax, the value-added tax was
not enacted at that time.
Interest in the value-added tax was revived by the Shoup
Mission to Japan in the early fifties. The Mission reccommended
the value-added tax as the primary source of revenue for the
local governments. The value-added tax was enacted but was
later repealed before it could take effect. The primary reason
for its rejection was that labor unions believed the tax to be
regressive. An excellent treatment of the Japanese experience
can be found in a series of articles by Brofenbrenner2 and in
an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Clara Sullivan.3 The
latter has done the definitive study of the history and development
of value-added taxation and an analysis of its administrative
aspects. Let me say, however, that the tax has been enacted in
France (1956) and in Michigan (1958). It is currently under
study by the British government and Carl Shoup has undertaken
1Report on Japanese Taxation by the Shoup Mission, (4 Vols.;
Tokyo: SCAP,1949).
2Martin Broffenbrenner, "The Japanese Value-Added Sales Tax,
National Tax Journal, Vol.III (Dec.,1950), pp.298-313. Also
The Aftermath of the Shoup Tax Reforms," National Tax Journal,
Vol.X (Sept.,Dec.,1957).
3Clara Sullivan, "The Historical Development of the Concept
of Value-Added Taxation, A (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University,1957).
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a study for the European Common Market. Finally, it has been
proposed in the U. S. as at least a partial substitute for the
corporate income tax.
Current theoretical interest in the value-added tax centers
around its relationship to other well known forms of taxation.
Depending upon how the base of the value-added tax is defined,
it has been asserted that the value-added tax is equivalent to
a consumption tax or a proportional income tax. The tax is also
of interest to students of economic growth who believe that the
value-added tax would be more stimulating to the rate of
investment than either the corporate income tax or the personal
income tax. That this may be the result in the case of the
corporate income tax can be seen readily by comparing marginal
tax rates on profits. If the two taxes are not shifted by the
factors of production on which they are imposed, a corporate
profits tax has a marginal rate of 52;7whereas a value-added tax
(of equal tax yield) is likely to have a marginal rate of approxi-
mately 14%
The purpose of this paper will be to study the value-added
tax in a general equilibrium framework, using both dynamic
analysis and comparative statics. Attention will be focused
on the merits of the value-added tax on its own right and as a
substitute for other well-known forms of taxation. To accomplish
the former, the value-added tax will be compared with a system
of lump-sum taxation--this being the ideal(if we are already at
-qi
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a Pareto optimum) tax from an allocative point of view.
Emphasis will also be put upon the distributional implica-
tions of value-added taxation; hence a general equilibrium
incidence analysis will be undertaken. Attention will also be
given to the effects of value-added taxation upon the short-run
stability of the economy. Finally, we will study the effect of
substituting a value-added tax for a corporate income tax
upon the level and pattern of investment. Whenever possible
existing empirical evidence will be employed in the analysis.
DEFINITIONS
The value-added tax is a tax upon the net sales of a firm
minus an appropriate depreciation charge. To arrive at its tax
base, a firm would deduct all of its intermediate purchases
on current account, its indirect business taxes, and economic
depreciation from total sales. In the aggregate, the tax base
is equal to national income (or net national product if we assume
away the existence of indirect business taxes). From this
identity it has been deduced that the value-added tax is equivalent
to a flat rate, no exemption, personal income tax. This
equivalence was first noticed by Shoup who also suggested another
form of value-added taxation. Under this other version no
lCarl Shoup, "'Theory and Background of the Value-Added Tax,"
Proceedings of the National Tax Association,(Oct.,1955),pp.6-19.
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depreciation is allowed on existing assets while all interfirm
purchases, both on current account and on capital account,
are deductible from sales. Adopting Shoup's terminology, the
latter variant will be referred to as a value-added tax of the
consumption type (CVA), and the former variant will be termed
a value-added tax of the income type (IVA). We can go one step
further and define a value-added tax of the gross product type
(GVA) under which neither depreciation nor interfirm purchases
on capital account are deductible from sales. As we shall see
below, the effects of the value-added tax depend critically upon
which of the three variants is imposed.
As Shoup has pointed out the tax base of the CVA is
conceptually equivalent to total consumers' expenditure in the
economy. Note that this equivalence is valid only in the
absence of indirect business taxation and if all government
expenditure is for capital goods. Otherwise the tax base of
the CVA is equal to total expenditure upon consumers 2 goods
(whether private or public) minus indirect business taxation.
In what follows we will assume that indirect business taxes do
not exist in our economy. Furthermore, it can be shown that the
effects of the CVA are invariant to the inclusion or exclusion
of government expenditure ip the tax base ( see p.2 8 ).
Hence for practical purposes the tax base of the CVA is equal
to private consumer expenditure. On this basis, Shoup concluded
that the CVA is equal to a flat rate consumptign'tax or
-7-
equivalently a retail sales tax. We shall see below that this
conclusion is unwarranted.
The GVA has as its base an amount equal to gross national
product (again assuming the absence of indirect business taxes),
It is easy to show that the GVA is equivalent to a sales tax
upon the final output of a4 economy (ie. a retail sales tax
and a sales tax upon capital goods--of equal rates).
The differences between the variants of the value-added
tax, then, rest upon their treatment of depreciation. Under the
CVA, instantaneous depreciation is granted to new plant and
equipment and no depreciation is allowed to owners of existing
assets. Under the IVA, the deduction of economic depreciation
is allowed on all equipment, new or old. Finally, a GVA would
not permit depreciation of any sort to be deducted.
Thus far we have not considered the definitional problems
of imputed rents, imputed interest, or goods and services in
kind. Indeed it would be impractical to include certain of these
items in the tax base. However the value-added tpx does not
differ in this respect from other well known forms of taxation
such as income taxes, sales taxes, or consumption taxes. We
will simply assume these problems away so that we can isolate
the differences between value-added taxation and other tax
systems. Hence we will assume that all forms of income are
taxed.
-8-
EQUIVALENCES AMONG THE VALUE-ADDED TAXES
In a classical full employment economy where the savings
rate (or equivalently the investment rate) is independent of
rate-of-return considerations and the supplies of factors of
production are inelastic, each of our variants of the value-
added tax has the same effect upon the pattern of goods and
services produced. To show this let us assume an economy where
government expenditures are financed entirely by a lump-sum
tax. It will also be assumed that the government spends its
entire tax revenue upon consumer's goods and that it balances
its budget. Factors of production are supplied inelastically
in any given period of time to two industries--a consumption
good industry and a capital good.* industry. Goods prices and
factor prices are established competitively. Finally, the
level of savings is a function only of real disposable income.
Under these assumptions our econcmy can be described by the
following set of equations:
(1.1) 0 c = Oc (Lc KC)
(1.2) 0 c = Ok(Lk, Kk)
c
(1.3) SL c = w
(1.4 k
aL k k
-9-
(30 C Pr
9KC8 0k P=r
C3 k = r
-k
aKk
L c+Lk
KC+Kk 
*
Y = P cc+Pk 0 k
(1.5)
(1.6)
(14'7)
(1.8)
(1.9)
(1.10) = c ( C+U)+Pk2
P CT = lump-sum tax formula
C = C(Yd/Pc)
Yd YP cT
PC (c+7)=Pc c
M-M(Y)
= output of consumer goods
Ok = output of capital goods
Pc0 c +Pk0k
(1.11)
(1.12)
(1.13)
(1.14)
(1.15)
(1.16)
where
Oc
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L = labor employed by the consumer good industry
Kc = capital employed by the consumer good industry
Kk = capital employed by the capital good industry
K = labor employed by the capital good industry
= total labor force
K = total capital stock
r = dollar rental on a new machine
w = dollar wage for one unit of labor
Pc = price of consumer goods
Pk = price of capital goods
Y = gross national product (in dollars)
Yd = money disposable income
C = consumer goods demanded by the private sector
I = demand for new capital goods
G = consumer goods demanded by government
T = taxes in terms of consumption goods
M = money demanded
= money supply
Equations (1,1) and (1.2) are the production functions for
the two outputs. Equations (1.3) - (1.6) are the demand functions
for the factors of production, while (1.7) and (1.8) are the
equilibrium conditions for the factor markets. Equation (1.9)
is the definition of gross national product which, by the use of
Euler~s equation, can be shown to be equal to wL+rK. Equation
(1.10) expresses the budget constraint for the economy, while
equation (1.11) is the requirement that the government balance
its budget. Equation (1.12) states at what real level the lump-
sum tax is to be set. Equation (1.13) is the consumption
function which asserts that consumption is a function only of
real disposable income. Equation (1.14) is simply the definition
of m6ney disposable income and (1.15) is the market equilibrium
condition for the consumer goods sector. Together with the
budget constraint, (1.15) also guarantees that the capital goods
market is cleared. Equation (1.16) is simply the equilibrium
condition in the money market. The form of the system of
equations (1.1) - (1.15) suggests that the system can be dichoto-
mized into real and monetary sectors. Hence the only function
of money in this economy is to establish the absolute level
of prices.
The above system of 16 equations and 16 unknowns will yield
an equilibrium solution for all variables which we shall
denote by barred variables. If we substitute a value-added tax
of whichever type for the lump-sum tax the above system of
equations will hold with the following exceptions:
(1.3a) $C PC = w(l+T)
aLc
(1.4a) aok Pk = w(1+t)
(1.5a) 0 Pc = r(l+T)
Kc
1 6 112-! !-
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(1.6a) 8 ]k Pk = r(l+T)
(l.12a) T = TY/Pc GVA
= (TY-TPk )/Pc CVA
= (TY-TPk6K)/Pc IVA
where 6 is the rate of depreciation permitted by the IVA.
If a double bar on a variable denotes the equilibrium solution
of the abcve system under a value-added tax then I assert that
the following equivalences hold
w = (1+ )
r =r/(1+T)
and all other variables remain as they were under the lump-sum
tax.
Because we have assumed inelastic factor supplies we need
only concentrate on the demand side of the model. On the demand
side the crucial equation is the consumption function. If it
can be shown that consumption remains constant then the pattern
of goods and services produced will also have remained unchanged.
Notice that taxes, PcT, enter only into the consumption function--
and in an additive manner. Since we keep tax receipts constant,
consumption must also be constant. Thus in a world where the
rate of return is unimportant and factors are supplied inelastically
any system of direct taxation will yield the same results.
Distributionally, however, this is not generally true; the
distribution of income will vary greatly under different direct
tax regimes. For example, under the CVA the amount of income
accruing to capitalists is
(. -)K + TPkOk
where as under a GVA it is
However, the equilibrium configuration of output and prices in
our economy is assumed to be independent of the distribution
of income. As long as we insist upon equal tax revenues any
form of direct taxation yields the same result.
It can also be shown that a sales tax upon final output,
ie. a GNP sales tax, will lead to the same pattern of output
and relative prices as a direct tax of equal revenue yield
(in real terms). For simplicity's sake let us assume that the
money supply is adjusted so that the tax can be passed on in the
form of higher prices. Under a sales tax of rate T we have
the following set of equations:
(llb) Oc = Oc (L cKc)
(1.2b) 0k = k (Lk,Kk)
(1.3b) c P w
- c<Lc
p
= w
'9c c
koC
k
PC
=r
KC+Kk
Y(1+T) = Pc (1+t)Oc
p c (1+tr)o c
+ Pk(l+t)Ok
Pk(l+ t)I+
(1.llb) " = T
(1.12b) (1+T)PcT = tP 0c + TPkOk
(l.13b) C =C(Y
(1.14b) Yd = Y
= Pc ( 1+ )O)c
(1.16b) V = M(Y(1+T) )
-14-
(1.4b)
(1. * 5b)
(1 o6b)
(1 .7b)
(1. 8b)
(1. 9b)
(l.l Ob) + Pk(l+T)Ok = c(l+T)(C+3)
(1. 15b) P c (l+ T) (C+Z)
-15-
Note that the dollar value of taxes is (1+T) times that
under the lump-sum regime because government expenditures
must be maintained at the same real level. Also notice that
in equation (1.13) the argument has shifted from (Y-Pc T)/P to
Y/PC (1+T). Thus in order for consumption to have remained
constant it is necessary that
'r=P cT/(Y-P cT)i c c
That this tax rate will produce the correct revenue of P c(l+)T
is easily verifiable. In the rest of the equations the (l+T)'s
cancel out and we are left with our original system (1.1)-(1.16)
except for a larger money supply.
In the preceding section we dealt with an economy in which
the rate of return to saving was of no consequence. We shall
now turn our attention to e.n economy where the level of consump-
tion (or equivalently the leyel of investment) depends upon
the rate of return earned by a new capital good as well as upon
the level of real disposable income. Specifically, it is assiqmed
that consumption is negatively related to the rate of interest.
This is by no means the most obvious assumption one can make
about savings decisions with respect to the rate of interest.
We shall treat the opposite case at the end of this section.
We assume, further, that investment is carried on up to the
point where the marginal efficiency of capital is equal to the
market rate of interest. Let $(v) be the exrected rental on a
new machine v years in the future. Furthermore, let investors
believe that the current market rate of interest will prevail
-16-
indefinitely into the future. Finally, let physical depreciation
on a new machine occur exponentially at the rate $. In other
words we assume that machines suffer radioactive decay; this
implies that v years in the future we will have e"6v of a
machine left. Under these assumptions the demand price for new
capital goods at any given point of time is given by:
A 0
(1.17) Pk = re-(i+b)vdv
where Pk is the demand price for capital and i is the prevailing
market rate of interest.
If the demand price (1.17) exceeds the supply price given
by (1.1)-(1.8), investors will bid up the market rate of
interest in order to secure more funds. In the preceding
section this mechanism had no effect upon the supply of savings
but in this formulation additional savings will be forthcoming.
The rate of interest will be bid up until the demand price for
new capital equals its.supply price. Ie.,
A
(1.18) Pk = k
If we combine (1.17) and (1.18) we can solve for the market
rate of interest under the lump-sum tax.
(1019) i = (r-EP[)/Pk
For simplicity's sake we have assumed that r(v)=r(o), for all
v, in caldulating i.
-17-
Now when we replace the lump-sum tax by a value-added tax
the outcome will depend critically upon which variant of the
value-added tax we choose. If we replace the lump-sum tax by
an IVA, (1.17) becomies
(1.17a) Pk = [r(l-ht) + T 6P]e-(i+6)v
where TI is the rate of IVA which would produce a yield equal
to that of a lump-sum tax. If we combine (1.l7a) and (1.18)
and solve for the equilibrium market rate of interest we find
(1.19) ii = (r-6Pk)(l_1 r)/Pk
Comparing (1.19a) with (1.19) it is clear that the market rate of
interest under the IVA is less than that under the lump-sum tax.
Since consumption is negatively related to the market rate of
interestthere will be more consumption under an IVA than under
a lump-sum tax or equivalently less investment.
If we replace the lump-sum tax by a GVA, (1.17) becomes
(1.17b) Pk = r( - E)e-( dv
0
where TE is the rate of GVA. Solving for the equilibrium rate
of interest we find
(r-6Pkk)(l-t) 
-g6p
(1.19b) ig =k
which is clearly less than that obtained under the lump-sum tax.
While it would also appear that the rate of interest is higher
under the IVA than under the GVA, this must be shown since the
rate of tax under the GVA is less than that under the IVA (the
latter allows depreciation whereas the former does not). If we
take the ratio of i6 to iI at the point where the system was in
-18-
equilibrium under the lump-sum tax we find
ig _-rg(1.20)
i 1-1
where Z 0
T 0-6Pk0
Clearly ig > i only if
(1.21) 16 < 51
But to produce equal revenues it must be that
(1.22) - -r'[l ~ r K+w L
Suibstituting from (1.22) into (1.21) we find
r r K+w L
(l.21a) Tg( 0 ) < T 0 0 )
r 0-6P k r K+w L-6PkK
or
0 < -6P0w0L
which is a contradiction. Hence iI > i. QE.D.
Finally, let us consider the case where the lump-sum tax
is replaced by a CVA. Remembering that the CVA allows
instantaneous depreciation, equation (1.17) becomes
(1,17c) Pk = r(l-r)e-(i+6)vdv + upk
where Tr is the rate of CVA. Combining (1.17c) and (1.18) we find
-19-
r r - 6Pk(1.19c) ir = r P
which is the same rate of interest as obtained under the
lump-sum tax. Thus even when saving is interest elastic the CVA
yields the same result as the lump-sum tax. It appears, therefore,
that the CVA is an ideal tax--ideal being used in the aliocative
sense. If labor is supplied elastically, however, the two taxes
are not equivalent since the real wage is reduced under the CVA.
The CVA, nevertheless, more nearly approximates the results
sought by H. G. Brown who argued that a proportional tax upon
all factors of production (ie. an IVA) was completely neutral. 1
He was wrong, of course, because the proportional factor tax
results in a distortion in the choice between future and current
consumption and between work and leisure. The CVA eliminates
the former but not the latter distortion.
In summary, of all the variants of the value-added tax
only the CVA produces the same results as the lump-sum tax
(except in the case where labor is supplied elastically). The
GVA, and to a, lesser extent, the IVA, discriminate in favor of
current consumption at the expense of future consumption; hence
they produce a lower rate of capital accumulation than would a
lump-sum tax or a CVA.
1H. G. Brown, The Incidence of a General Output or a
General Sales Tax, Readings in the Economics of Taxation,
ed. R. Musgrave, C Shoup (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irivin,
1959) pp. 330-39.
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The latter conclusion can be reached only if saving is
positively related to the rate of interest. There is no
a priori feason to suspect that this is the case. As a matter
of fact a convinicing argument can be made that saving will be
less in the face of higher interest rates. Savers might be
tempted to spread the gain from higher interest receipts
between future and present consumption. To see this more
clearly we can make use of the following simple diagram:
C, Figure 1
C D
C,
Under, say, a GVA an individual can, if he does not save,
enjoy Uo of consumption in the present and Ul of consumption
in the future (after all taxes have been paid). Let us
assume that he decides to do some saving and his equilibrium
-M .
-21-
point is point B on AC Under a CVA, on the other handthe
individual is faced with the same alternatives as before
except that he can now transform present income into future
income along the line AC 9 It is reasonable to assume that
the individual may choose as his new equilibrium a point
along AC between the doordinates D and E. In this area the
individual will enjoy more consumption in both time periods.
Hence he will be on a higher utility curve--sonething which cannot
definitely be said about any other point along ACJ . Of course
we cannot tell if the individual will in fact choose a point
in this trangle since we do not know his preference map. But
it certainly represents a plausible pattern of behavior--much
more plausible in fact than a point along AC1 to the right
of E.
Thusa priori reason is not enough to tell us whether
saving is positively related to the interest rate. However,
in order to remain within the classical model this assumption
will be made throughout the paper. If saving is negatively
related to the rate of interest most of our conclusions with
respect to capital accumulation in the preceding section and in
what follows need simply be reversed.
EQUIVALENCES WITH OTHER TYPES OF TAXES
That the IVA is equivalent to a flat rate income tax can be
readily seen by the use of the following income indentity:
sales - purches on current account + net change in
in inventories - depreciation =
wages + interest + rents + profits
-22-
First, note that we must deduct the net change in inventories
from gross purchases because these are purchases on capital
account and not on current account; to exclude them from the
tax base would be to discriminate in favor of inventory
investment as opposed to durable capital. Next, notice that the
right hand side of our identity is what we usually define as the
tax base of an income tax. The left hand side on the other
hand is equal to the tax base of the IVA. Theref6re we are
justified in regarding the IVA as equivalent to an income tax.
Whereas an income tax serves as a wedge between a factorys
take-home pay and his net pay, the IVA serves as a wedge between
the gross wage paid by the firm and a factor's take-home pay--the
result is identical.
There is one slight differnce between an IVA and an income
tax which is related to the concept of loss offsets. Under an
income tax, a bondholder can, if the company goes into bankruptcy,
write off the capital loss against other income; or he may even
be permitted to carry phe loss forward over the next few years,
No such provision would exist under the IVA since the taxable
unit is the firm. Insofar as lenders are influenced by risk and
the latter is approximated by the expected variance of the yield
of a bond, there will be an increase in the rate of interest
demanded by lenders when the IVA is substituted for a proportional
income tax.
One might be tempted, at this point, to assert that under
an IVA there will be a substitution made of the factor intermediate
purchases for other factors of production. This is due to the
fact that the latter is taxed whereas the former is not. While
this assertion is true if we restrict the tax to a single firm
or a single industry (or even several industries), it is not
true if the tax is general (ie. applicable to all firms within
the economy). Because the tax is all pervasive, the price of
intermediat-e goods will reflect the tax.(intermediate goods are
merely embodied-primary factors). Consequently, the- short-run
neutrality of the IVA with respect to productive technique
is maintained. Note, however, that the foregoing argument can
only strictly be applied to a closed economy. In an open economy,
there will be a substitution made of imported raw materials for
other factors of production. In order to maintain neutrality
in an open economy, a tax of equal rate must be levied on
imports.
In his textbook, The Theory of Public Finance, Professor
Musgrave asserts the equivalence between a flat rate income
tax and a system of retail sales taxation and a sales tax
on capital goods! This implies that the IVA is also equal to
that system of taxation. We will set out to show that this
equivalence does not hold. Specifically, there will be a
higher level of investment under the sales tax regime than under
the IVA,
In order for the two systems of taxation to be equivalent
they must produce the same rate of return on new capital; this
1Richard A Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) pp. 378-9.
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implies a definite restriction on the size of the tax
rate on new capital goods. Secondly, they must yield the
same real level of consumption; this implies a restriction
on the size of the tax rate on consumer goods and hence a
second restriction on the size of the tax rate on capital
goods. We will show that the two restrictions on the tax
rate on capital goods are inconsistent.
Before we can begin the proof, we must make several
institutional assumptions that will facilitate the analysis.
We assume that when we change from an IVA to a sales tax the
money supply is adjusted so that consumers bear the tax in the
form of higher prices. This assumption will not change the
results of the analysis in any way. We also assume that the
IVA is paid by factor owners and not by the firm; in this
sense we are dealing with an income tax. Finally, we assume
that firms own no capital--they rent all of their equipment.
Capital is owned entirely by a group to whom we shall refer
to as rentiers. The rentiers pay all taxes on capital.
Under this set of assumptions,the economy can be described
by the following sets of equations:
IVA SALES TAX
(1.22) 0c = O c(Kc' c) 0 c = 0 c (KcLc)
(1.23) 0k = Ok(Kk,Lk) 0k = Ok(KkL k)
(1.24) = k w =
c c c c
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(1.38) R = M(Y) M=M(Y)
Where-rI is the rate of IVA, T is the sales tax on consumer
goods, and Tk is the sales tax on capital goods.
If the two tax systems are to be equivalent, they must
yield identical solutions for all variable's except the definitional
variables Y and Yd* Specifically, the level of consumption
expenditure (in real terms) must be the same in both economies.
In order to provide equal levels of consumption) the two systems
must provide the same level of real disposable income and the
same rate.of interest. There is a case where these two variables
might offset one another but we shall ignore it as being too
improbable. We will now proceed with the proof under the assumption
that the equilibrium solutions of the two systems are the same.
Proof:
Let and Y denote the equilibrium solution for money
disposable incomes under the IVA and sales tax systems
respectively. In order for the same level of real disposable
income to result it must be that
Y(1+tc)Pc d(YTPc)(l+t0 )
Ysdc d
this implies that
PcT
(i) Y = c
Y -PcT
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In order to
(ii)
provide revenues of T(1+Tc)Pc? k must satisfy
T k0k + Tc cOc = (1+rc) cT
Substituting for T c from (i) we find that
(iii) SC = Ik
Now -k must also be set so as to equalize the rate of return
between the tax systems. Hence
Ok 1
t It-i where X = rr-bP k
It can be shown that
(v) 1 < rc cTP0Xr-1 r
Hence (iii) and (iv) are inconsistent. Furthermore from
the above it can be deduced that
k TPc
<Y-TP
d c
C
if we insist on equal rates of return. But this implies that
real disposable income is less under a sales tax than under
an IVA. Hence,
(iv)
- - ii "I'Ma a ,% .- r
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Thus it appears that a sales tax system is more effective
than an income tax in stimulating investment. It accomplishes
this by reducing real disposable income to a greater extent
than the more direct IVA. The reason for the latter is purely
arithmetic. In order to bring about the equality of the rate
of return under both tax systems it is necessary that the
sales tax on consumer goods be set so high as to reduce real
disposable income below that of the IVA. We shall see that the
same phenomenon occurs when we compare the CVA with the
consumption tax.
CVA vs CONSUMPTION TAX
That the tax base of the CVA is equal to that of a consumption
tax can easily be shown through the use of the basic national
income identity--consumption + gross investment = gross national
product. Under both the CVA and the consumption tax, gross
investment is excluded from the tax base. Notice, however,that
when we introduce government the national income identity
becomes--consumption + gross investment + government expenditures =
gross national product. In order to maintain the equivalence
between the tax bases, government expenditures must be exempted
from the CVA or included in the base of the consumption tax.
It can be shown that if the base of the consumption tax is
expanded to include government purchases, precisely the same
-29-
tax rate would result as when government purchases are excluded
from the tax base.
TPc(1+Tr) = -rc (C+J)
is equivalent to
TPc c
Hence, altering the base of the consumption tax to include
government expenditures changes nothing. We can validly
claim the equivalence between the tax base of the CVA and the
consumption tax.
Even though they have identical tax bases, the consumption
tax and the CVA are not equivalent as has been usually asserted.
To show this we make the same set of assumptions as we did
when we compared the IVA with a system of sales taxes. As a
matter of fact we can employ the same set of equations except
the tax equations and the rate of return equations. Furthermore
we must set Tk = 0 is the sales tax model. The tax equations
now read:
(1.33a) PcT = rry _ 
(1.33b) (l+tc)PcT = Tc cC + Tcpc
for the CVA and consumption tax respectively. Furthermore
the rate of return equations now become:
(1.37a) Pk =r(1-Tr)e-(i+)vdv + TPk
7,
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(1.37b) Pk = Sre-(i+b)Vdv
for the CVA and consumption taxes. From our previous analysis
of the CVA we know that (1.37a) collapses to:
(1.37a) Pk = re-(i+6)vdv
Shoup and others have argued on the basis of the identity
of (1.37b) and (1.37a) and the equivalence of tax bases, that
the two taxes were equivalent.1 Their error was that they did
not probe deeply enough into the general equilibrium system. For
upon examination of the consumption functions of both tax models,
we see that precisely the same phenomenon occurs as did in our
comparison of a sales tax system with the IVJ. Namely, real
disposable income will be less under the consumption tax regime
than under the CVA. To prove this we need only to reproduce the
requirement for equal real disposable incomes--
c PT
Y - PcT
But this rate of tax will not provide the government with enough
revenue. For example let our comparison function be of the form:
C =a(i) Yd
Pc (1+-)
Then our tax receipts will be
TP
c , PcOC = aTPC
Yd~ cT
which is adequate only if c = 1. Thus
1Shoup, loc. cit.
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Y d- P cT
and hence consumption is higher under a CVA than under a
consumption tax. Again the rationale for this conclusion
is simply a matter of arithmetic. Consumption taxes simply
reduce disposable income to a greater extent than an equal
yield CVA.1  An alternative explanation is that, under a
consumption tax, an individual can reduce his tax burden by
consuming less. Under a CVA, on the other hand, an individual
does not affect his tax bill by consuming more or less; it
depends only upon his income. It is true, however, that the
more all individuals consume the higher the tax bilI that
they, as a group, must pay.
1 This is because consumption taxes affect all of disposable
income whereas the CVA affects only that portion which is
spent on consumption. To see this, simply compare real
disposable income under the two regimes. For the
consumption tax this is given by
c Y 0 + (_ k
d Pc (l+tc) 1 +-c P c (l+Tc)
Under a CVA we have
r Y-P T P
Y 0 0d c Pc k
to provide equal revenues it must be that
Tr0c c
1+-r
Thus our expression for real disposable income under the CVA becomes
Yr0 cPk.)Y = 1r) + ( k
d (1+T~c c k.
There is another major difference between a consumption
tax and a CVA. Let us rewrite (1.37a) as
(1.37a) Pk = re-(i+6)vdv + [ rPk-Tr re-(+6)ydv]
As w6 have previously pointed out the term in brackets is
equal to zero. But what is the term in brackets? It is
the present-discounted value of taxes paid by owners of
new capital--zero. If we had started our economy from
scratch (zero capital stock) capitalists would never have paid
any taxes. As a matter of fact if the economy is always growing
(positive net investment) there would have been a negative
flow cf taxes from government to business (in present-value terms).
In such a situation the CVA resembles a wage tax, since only
wage income is taxed.
This result should not be surprising. Samuelson's
non-substitutiono theorem tells us that if there is only
one primary factor of production, the relative price of
goods will reflect only their labor requirements, both direct
and indirect. Consequently, if we have a tax system in
which both the returns to labor and to capital are taxed,
the prices of those goods which are relatively capital
intensive will rise relative to those goods which are relatively
P. A. Samuelson, Abstract of a Theorem Concerning
Substitutibility in Open Leontief Models, Activit Analysis
of Production and Allocation, ed. T.C. Koupmans New York:
John Wiley +'Song, 1951), pP. 142-46.
labor intensive. This is so because we tax the capital
good input twice--once in the form of labor and again in
the form of capital. Only a wage tax would not change the
long-run equilibrium set of relative prices dictated by
technology. The nice neutrality aspects of the CVA arise
similarly through its exemption of the returns to capital
from taxation. While it is true that the CVA would tax
owners of existing capital)if it were imposed tomorrow,
this would not affect long-run relative prices because these
returns are pure economic rents.
The consumption tax, on the other hand, reaches all forms
of income, whatever the source when that income is spent
for consumption. The consumption tax would approximate a
wage tax only if all wages were consumed and all returns to
capital were saved.
GVA vs GNP SALES TAX
To show that a GVA is equal to a GNP sales tax we will
again refer to the model used in the analysis of the IVA.
As before we wil have new tax equations and new rate of
return equations. Futhermore, in the sales tax model we must
equate Tc and Tk. The new tax equations now read
(1.33c) PcT =
(1.33d) P cT(l+Tc) cc c + TkPk0k
for the GVA and GNP sales tax respectively. The rate of
return equations now become
(1.37c) Pk = 5r(l-T6)e-(i+6)vdv
00
(1.37d) Pk(l+t) = sre-(i+6)vdv
In order for the GNP sales tax to provide the same rate of
-4i
return as the GVA it is necessary that
(1.40) Tc =g g
Now T1must satisfy
(1.41) TgY = T T = TPc
or
(1.42) T = TP0
Y
If we substitute from (1.42) into (1.40) we obtain
TP(1.43) 
-c r s c
Yd TPc
which is precisely the value of T C necessary to make
consumption the same under both tax systems. Hence it
must be that the GNP sales tax and the GVA are equivalent.
A
lm- WO "! 4 W - . - -
-55-
MODEL WITH INTERMEDIATE GOODS
So far we have been concerned with an economy in which
there exists only two productive sectors: a capital-good
producing sector and a consumption-good producing sector.
The results of this model can easily be generalized to an
economy which, besides the two aforementioned sectors, has
n intermediate-good producing sectors. Such an economy
can be described by the following model:
1
0 i(Li K 0Z,.......0 )
i i
i fi =f
Y = P k 0 k
i= (c,k,1,....,n)
i = (c,k,1,....,n)
f = (L,K,0,....,0n)
i = (c,k,1,....,n)
f = (1K0..,4
+ PC 0c
Y = PkI + Pc(C+U)
GTT
Pc(C+E) = PcOc
Y 
iC = C(- Cd
Yd = Y PcT
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= M( iP.O.)
Pk = re-(i+6)vdv
Pk = k
As one can observe only the production equations have
changed from our earlier system. If we consider the imposition
of a value-added tax, of whatever type, the production
equations remain unchanged (since labor and capital are
supplied inelastically). The demand side has also remained
unchanged, save for a larger money supply requirement.
Hence all of our previous analysis also applies to this
expanded system.
CAPITAL GAINS AND THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
We have yet to consider what will be the effect, upon
the price of existing capital goods of the substitution
of a value-added tax for a lump-sum tax. As might be
expected the price change varies, depending upon which
variant of the value-added tax we choose to impose.
It can be easily shown that the price of a machine of
age v is equal to e-6v times the price of a new machine;
this is true so long as the tax system treats new and old
machines in the same manner. Hence if the price of a new
machine rises when we substitute a value-added tax for a
lump-sum tax, a capital gain will accrue to owners of
6L
existing capital. The only way for the price of a new
machine to increase is through an increased demand for
capital goods (unless constant opportunity costs exist
between the two sectors). As we have already shown, the
demand for new capital goods falls when we substitute either
a GVA or an IVA for a lump-sum tax. Hence there will be
capital losses if the change is made. Similarly the demand
for capital goods is lower under a GVA than under an IVA.
Thus a shift from the former to the latter results in a
capital gain.
We can extend this analysis to a profits tax. A
profits tax results in the smallest demand for capital goods
of all the aforementioned taxes. Consequently the imposition
of a profits tax results in a capital loss.
When we compare a CVA with a lump-sum tax, on the
other hand, we find that the CVA results in a capital loss
despite the fact that the demand for new capital remains
unchanged. This is because owners of existing assets are
allowed no depreciation allowance at all. Consequently, a
machine of age v will sell for (1-T)e~b times the price
of a new machine. Now it is impossible to compare a CVA
with an IVA, GVA, or profits tax unless we a capable of
specifying the parameters of the system so that we can tell
exactly how much the price of new capital goods changes.
We can also infer from our previous analysis that if
we substitute a consumption tax for a lump-sum tax owners
- I -
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of existing assest will enjoy a capital gain. Thus if we
substitute any of the other taxes for a consumption tax
capital losses will result.
Finally, our conclusions will be altered if we allow
the money supply to be increased so that the tax is passed
on in the form of higher prices. This, however, is purely
an inflation effect and should be ignored.
CHAPTER II
INCIDENCE EFFECTS
OF VALUE-ADDED TAXATION
Of all the effects of value-added taxation, its inci-
dence effects are perhaps the most important and generally
the most elusive. By the term incidence we mean the changes
in the distribution of welfare brought about by the intro-
duction of a particular tax. Since a person's welfare is
not measurable and hence not comparable, economists usually
assume that real income serves as a satisfactory index of
a personas well being and as a basis for making inter-
personal welfare comparisons. In this chapter, we will be
concerned with determining the effects of value-added taxation
upon the distribution of real income within an economy.
Not only will we be concerned with the.intratemporal
distribution of income, but we will also take into account
shifts in the intertemporal distribution of income. As we
have seen in the preceding chapter, certain shifts in tax
structure may alter the rate of capital accumulation--
thereby changing the income available for distribution in
future periods. Expressed differently--we must take into
account changes in the size of the income pie as well as
its division.
In order to determine the incidence effects of the
value-added tax we must specify the manner in which it is
to be introduced. Musgrave has suggested three potential
-39-
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experiments that we can perform.1 First, we can hold all
other taxes and expenditures constant. Musgrave refers
to this as "specific"incidence. Whereas there may be
valid reasons for wanting to know the specific incidence
of a tax, in the current context it is clearly inadequate.
The effects of the value-added tax would be confounded with
the effects of the resulting unemployment and/or demand
readjustments.
Secondly, we can increase government expenditures by
the amount of the yield of the value-added tax. This
experiment would determine the "balanced-budget aincidence
of the value-added tax. While this approach avoids some
of the pitfalls of specific incidence it creates new ones
which may perhaps be more troublesome. The effects of the
value-added tax now become entangled with the distributional
aspects of the increased government expenditure. Further-
more not all of the demand problems associated with specific
incidence have been solved because of the employment and/or
inflationary effects caused by the balanced-budget multiplier.
The third experiment suggested by Musgrave is termed
differential incidence. Here we replace an existing tax with
a value-added tax of equal yield while holding government
expenditures constant. Clearly this last approach is the
most appropriate for our purposes. It is true, however,
that our conclusions depend critically upon which tax is
1Musgrave, op. cit., pp. 211-17.
replaced. From a normative point of view the latter is not
a drawback but an advantage since it permits us to choose
the best tax structure among a multitude of alternatives.
A given tax structure is rarely of inte:'est on its own
right but only of interest when compared to the existing
structure. The value-added tax is no exception. It is
commonly proposed as a substi:tute for the corporate profits
tax. Hence, among the experiments we will perform is the
substitution of a value-added tax for a profits tax. Other
experiments include a comparison of the different variants
of the value-added tax and a comparison of the CVA and a
consumption tax.
The primary reason for the elusiveness of incidence
analysis is that, in general, notling can be said. The
general assumptions of profit maximization and perfect compe-
tition are insufficient, in themselves, to provide unambiguous
conclusions--other assumptions must be added. Even this may
not be enough since our conclusions often depend upon the size
of parameters about which little is known and little can be
determined. Therefore, the conclusions of our incidence analy-
sis may depend critically upon the set of assumptions we choose
to make concerning the structure of the model and its
parameter values.
In what follows, our basic assumptions will be the same
as those of the preceding chapter: balanced budget, perfect
- U
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competition, inelastic factor supplies in the short run
and two producing sectors. For analytical convenience,
we will assume that our money supply is held fixed at that
level where the price of consumer goods is equal to one.
Thus, all of the money variables of the preceding chapter
are now expressed in terms of consumption goods. More
specific assumptions will be made as the occasion arises,
but we shall strive for as much generality as possible.
SHORT-RUN INCIDENCE
A. Caeteris Paribus Shifts in Tax Structure
Even though we have assumed factor supplies to be inelas-
tic in the short run, the question of short-run incidence is
not uninteresting. The first question which comes to mind is
how the various tax systems affect the functional distribution
of income. One method of measuring these effects is to compare
after-tax factor rewards as we make caeteris paribus shifts in
tax structure. That is for any given set of prices and pattern
of output, we calculate and compare net factor earnings under
the different tax regimes. While it is generally true that
all other things do not remain equal in the face of a shift
in tax structure, this approach provides us with a useful first
approximation. We shall see, in the preceding section, that
this first approximation is valid under a wide variety of
assumptions about relative price changes.
If we compare the net real wage (wage in terms of consumer
goods) under the different tax regimes, we find that it will
-I
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be highest under a profits tax and lowest under the CVA and
the consumption tax. The complete ranking of tax systems by
net real wage is as follows
(I) Profits tax > GVA > IVA > CVA = Consumption tar
To show this we make use of the following table.
TABLE I
Comparison of Net Wages and Net Rentals Under
Alternative Tax Systems
After-tax After-tax
Tax System Tax Formul Real Wage Real Rental
Profits tax
GVA
IVA
CVA
iConsumption tax
1where
T = TP(rK-6PK)
T = TE(rK+wL)
T = TI(rK+wL-6PK)
T = tr(rK+wL-POk
S T= cC
w
w(l-TI)
w( ' c)1+T)
r(1-Tp )+6PTp
r(l-tg)
r(l-T I)+6PT
r(-Tr)
r( cl+T
T = rate of profits tax
T '= rate of GVA
T = rate of CVA
I I
IT= Z'ate of IVA
-44-.
Tc = rate of consumption tax
r = gross rental in terms of consumption goods
w = gross wage
P = price of capital goods in terms of consumption goods
Other variables as they have been previously defined.
This table was obtained by simply applying the tax rate to
the before-tax wage and subtracting this amount from it.
It is obvious from Table (I) that the profits tax results
in the highest net wage. It is equally obvious that T9 is
less than T and Tr since we have narrowed the tax base;
I
hence the net wage is higher under the GVA than under the IVA
or CVA. Furthermore, as long as net investment is positive,
,j < -r ; thus the IVA results in a higher net wage than the
CVA. All that remains to show is the ranking of the
consumption tax. If we equate the tax formulae of the CVA and
consumption tax we obtain:
(2.1) TcC = Tr (rK+wL-POk rc
also
(2.2) c 0 = c ( c-T) = TcOc(1-r r)
Substituting from (2.2) into (2.1) we find
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(2.3) c = (1-r)
Hence the consumption tax and the CVA have equivalent effects
upon real labor income.
Contrary to what one may have expected, the ranking (I)
is not exactly reversed when we consider net rentals. In the
normal case, the ranking of tax systems by rental incomes
will look as follows:
(II) IVA > GVA > CVA = Consumption tax > Profits Tax
By normal we mean that gross labor income (inclusive of tax)
exceeds gross investment expenditures. If this condition does
not hold the profits tax will exchange positions with the
CVA and the consumption tax. To show how this ranking was
derived, we will proceed in step-by-step fashion.
GVA vs IVA
Equating tax functions, we find
(2.4), T.(rK+wL) = TI[r-6P(K+wL)]
If the IVA is to be ranked below the GVA, then
r(l- TI) + 6PTI < r(l- TI)(2.5)
~I -
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Substituting for T from (2.4) into (2.5) we find
(2.6) ( r ) < 1
r-sp
which is a contradiction. Hence IVA > GVA:
GVA vs CVA
Equating tax functions, we obtain
(2.7) Tg(rK+wL) = tr(rK+wL-POk)
or
(2.8) T9 = YT where y
rK+wL-POk
rK+wL
If the GVA
(2.9)
is to be ranked below the CVA, then
r(1-ytr) < r(1-,r
which is obviously false. Hence GVA > CVA.
CVA vs Profits Tax
Equating tax functions, we find
(2.10)
or
(2.11)
Tr(rK+wL-POk) = TP(r-bP)K
wL+rK-POk r
S=[(r-bP)K
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only at the expense of existing capital because all tax
paympnts and tax credits, under these taxes, affect only
factors of production. Note, however, that we do not make
both factors worse off when we shift from a profits tax to
a CVA. Adding labor income to the tax base more than offcets
the tax credit given to investors from the point of view of
the net rental.
We encounter the same phenomenon when we shift from an
IVA or GVA to a consumption tax--the net reward (in terms
of consumption goods) to both factors is reduced. The
reason here is straightforward. Because we measure factor
returns in terms of consumption goods, the entire rate of
consumption tax is applicable to them. Thus to produce an
equivalent effect upon factor incomes, a direct tax system
must have the same tax base as the consumption tax (ie. a CVA).
The bases of the IVA and GVA are greater than that of the
consumption tax; hence the tax rates of the former are
lower than those necessary to reduce factor returns to that
level produced by the consumption tax.
B. Prices and Outputs Allowed to Adjust
Our next step will be to examine how sensitive the
rankings (I) and (II) are to our assumption of caeteris paribus
tax shifts. We will find that they may be quite sensitive,
depending upon the relative capital intensities of our two
producing sectors. To show this, let us consider an economy
which is in short-run equilibrium under a GVA. Let the
equilibrium real wage rate be given by w, and let T6 be the
rate of GVA. The net wage is thus (1-T6)wg. If we replace
the GVA by a profits tax and allow the economy to readjust,
the new equilibrium net wage will be wP. In our previous
discussion we implicitly assumed that wP = wg. Recall,
however, that replacing a GVA with a profits tax results in
a demand shift from capital goods to consumer goods(the
rate of return on investment being higher under a GVA than
under a profits tax). If the capital good industry is
unambiguously less capital intensive than the consumer good
industry (ie. at any wage-rental ratio the capital goods
industry employs a lower raitio of capital to labor than
does the consumer good industry) and the production functions
exhibit constant returns to scale, a shift from capital
goods to consumer goods will be accompanied by a fall in
the capital-labor ratio of both industries. Because the pro-
1This can be easily demonstrated by the use of a Bowley-
Edgeworth box diagram.
K ,'
To say that the capital-good industry is unambiguously less
capital-intensive than the consumer-good industry is to
say that the contract curve (CC) always lies below the diagonal.
Furthermore, our assumption of homogeneous production functions
guarantees that as we move along the contract curve in
the Ocdirection we increase the capital-labor ratio of both
industries.
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duction functions of both industries exhibit constant
returns to scale, wP must be less than wg. If, on the other
hand, the capital good industry is relatively capital
intensive, wp must be greater than 0. In the former case
the net wage increases by less than Tg wg when we shift tax
structure, In the latter case it increases by more than
Tg .w. Only if constant opportunity costs exists will the
net wage rise by exactly Tg w9.
Nothing of what we have said so far has shown the
rankings (I) and (II) to be an incorrect index of changes
in the functional distribution of income. As long as the
net wage, in terms of consumption goods, does not fall,
labor is better off under a profits tax than under a GVA.
But can the net wage fall? We know from the properties of
homogeneous production functions that as the gross wage
falls the gross rental on capital must rise. The elasticity
of the gross rental with respect to the gross wage is given
by the relative share of labor in the consumer good industry.
1 To see this, consider the production function of the
consumer good industry
o = F c(Lc,Kc) = Lc F c(1,m) = L cf(M)
K
where mc L L
c c
In equilibrium
w =f,- mf
r ft c
Hence
w = f - mcr
Footnote continued
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If we can show that a fall in the gross wage, such that
wP < (1-Tr)wE, must be accompanied by a rise in the rate
of return on investment, then we have demonstrated the
impossibility of reducing the net real wage when we shift
from a GVA to a profits tax. This is because, under our
assumptions, a shift from capital goods to consumer goods
must be accompanied by a fall in the marginal propensity
to save; the latter, in turn, can only be accomplished via
a reduction in the rate of return to investment. To show
this we make use of the following production possibility
diagram.
C&ot a/ Figure (2)
Goods
(Footnote continued)
and = m
r c
rK w
Now = . =mcew Q.E.D.
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Initially, under the GVA, we were in equlibrium at
point E , with output of consumption goods of O5 and
investment 51g. OG represents the real level of government
taxation; hence disposable income is given by UYg. When we
replace the GVA by a profits tax, our equilibrium point
shifts to EP, with consumer good output of 0Q. and invest-
ment 0T. Since the level df government taxation remains
constant, disposable income has fallen to UYP. Now at EP
we are consuming more than at Eg and we are doing this with
a smaller disposable income. If our consumption function
is of the form C = C(Yd,i) with > 0 and C< 0
d)a Yd ci2
then the above could only have come about if i < ig.
We can also demonstrate that, for a certain class of
production functions, there may be no conflict between
wP < wg(l-T) and iP < ig. In this case it is possible f<
labor to be made worse off when we switch from a GVA to a
profits tax. Our proof is given as follows:
Let our production functions be of the Cobb-Douglas
form. Namely
(2.14) 0c = X L (l-O)KO
c1c c
(2.15) 0k = Ua K
We can also express these as
(2.14a) 0c = L Xmc Cc c
(2.15a) 0k = LkXkm
K.
where m =- i = (c,k)
In equilibrium the following conditions will hold
(2.16)
(2.17)
(2.18)
(2.19)
Now we wish
(2.20)
implies that
r = X c0c
r = PXkamk(a-1)
w = X (1-P)mp
c C
w = PXk(1-a)mk
to establish that
w9 = wp(1-TE)
(2.21)1 i = r (1-T)P > r(l- :) = gP
in the case where 0 > a
1From the form of (2.21) it appears as if depreciation
is not being permitted under the profits tax. However, it
is easy to see that as long as rentals make up the entire
tax base it makes little difference whether we introduce a
depreciation allowance or not. The tax rate can simply
be adjusted so as to keep the two variants at equal revenue
yield. ie. the following relationship exists between tax
rates: T = [ r/(r-P)]-T where T is that variant of the
profits tax which permits depreciation to be deducted.
If we substitute from (2.16) and (2.17), (2.21) becomes
(2.21a) ( k (-
k
g
1- T
from (2.16) through (2.18) it is easily seen that
(2.22)
'upk
= B
S
Furthermore if we combine (2.18)
(2,20a) mp = mg (1-19) '
Together with (2.22) this yields
(2.23)
and (2.20) we obtain
.P = m(1-19)k k
If we substitute from (2.23) into the inequality (2.21a)
we obtain
(2.24)
Equating tax functions and substituting we find
(2.25)
= [(1*1 1)
where m = K/L and by assumption m > m. Substituting from
c
(2.25) into (2.24) and using Taylor series approximations
S= a
(1--rp) > (1-Tg)
+ (1-18g)- e) g
B =
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we obtain
(2.26) 1- l+S-a g 1
which reduces to
m(2.27) (1-a) > (1+,rg) mc(1-0) -(1-P) T
Now (2.27) is clearly a function of mP/m. It can be shown
that (2.27) is satisfied when m /m is set at its minimum
value and is violated when mn/m is at its maximum value.c
To see this we use the identity.
(2.28) m = <pmc + (1-<p)mk
where <p = L c/L and serves as the weighting factor. Furthermore
from (2.22) we find that we can rewrite (2.28) as:
(2.29) mc p + (l-cp)S/B
Clearly, for any given a and , -- is at a maximum
where <p = 0. Ie.
m
(2.30) ( ) = B/S
If we substitute from (2.30) into (2.27) we obtain
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(2.31) 1 --- > TgE [ -S- I~a a 1-a
which is clearly untrue. On the other .hand we can see from
(2.29) that
mi
(2.31) (m 4) min 1
at p = 1. Plugging (2.31) into (2.27) we obtain
(2.32) 1 - P + a > 1 +
which is clearly true. Thus, in the case of Cobb-Douglas
production functions, whether or not the net real wage can
fall when we shift from a CVA to a profits tax, depends upon,
among other things, the proportion of output devoted to the
production of consumer goods (indicated by the size of cp).
The larger the output of consumer goods, all other things
constant, the less likely the net wage will fall when we
shift from a GVA to a profits tax. Q.ED.
What is the significance of these findings? They
suggest that it may be possible to make labor worse off
when a profits tax is substituted for a GVA. This is a bit
surprising since intuitively it does not seem possible that
a secondary force--the reallocation of factors of production-
could undo the effects of the primary force--a change in tax
structure. No increase in the size of the capital stock is
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necessary to achieve this effect; the reallocation of existing
capital stock can do the trick.
Under what conditions can this "perverse0 result be
realized? There appears to be two primary factors at work.
First, the saving rate must be highly sensitive to changes
in the rate of return. If the interest-elasticity of saving
were zero there would occur no demand shift from capital goods
to consumer goods and hence no relative price change. A
necessary condition, therefore, is that the saving rate be
highly interest elastic. The latter is not a sufficient condition
since, as we have already seen, the presence of constant oppor-
tunity costs between the two industries rm-eSdts in a constant
gross wage--regardless of any demand shift. A constant
gross wage necessarily means a higher net real wage under
the profits tax than under the GVA. This suggests that the
production functions of the two industrief. must differ
significantly in capital intensity. Not only must the capital
intensities differ but they must do so in the direction of a
higher capital intensity in the consumer good industry.
From what we know about the parameters of the system,
it appears unlikely that this (1perversel result could ever
be witnessed. First of all there is evidence that savings
is not highly interest elastic. Furthermore, it is a subject
of much debate as to whether saving is even positively related
to the rate of interest. Nothing can be said about relative
capital intensities since little is known about them.
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We have yet to inquire as to what happens to the after-
tax rental when we change from a GVA to a profits tax.
Fortunately, the answer is quite clear. We know that
(2.33) ip + 6STp - 6 < ig r(- ) - 6
PP P9
Fron this and the fact that PP < Pg it is easy to establish
that
(2.34) rP(1--T) + 6PPTP < r(l-xg)
Thus the after tax rental always decreases when we shift
from a GVA to a profits tax. It is conceivable, therefore,
that if we make the aforementioned tax shift both factors
might be made worse off. One might question this conclusion
on the basis that with constant taxes and the identity
Gross National Product = Taxes + Net Wages + Net Rentals
it is impossible to make both fac .ors worse off. The answer
is that, because we measure our variables in terms of
consumption goods, gross national product falls when we
substitute a profits tax for a GVA. To see this simply
refer to Figure (2) on p. 51. Under the GVA, gross national
product, in terms of consumer goods, is given by QYg whereas
under the profits tax it is given by OYP.
The above analysis can be generalized to the cases of
shifting from an IVA to a profits tax or an IVA to a GVA.
We must, however, amend our conclusions somewhat when we
consider the case of replacing a CVA with a profits tax.
In this case it is possible that the after-tax rental in-
creases. Unlike the GVA or IVA, the rate of return under
the CVA is equal to the before-tax rental-minus depreciation-
divided by the price of capital goods [(r/P -6)], whereas
under the GVA or IVA it was equal to the after-tax rental
divided by the price of capital goods [ie. r(l-T)/P -6].
Thus the inequality (2.33) becomes
(2.33a) i =r(1-TE) + 6-1 - 6 < ir r 6PP Pr
from which we can establish
(2.35) rP(1-T) + TP6 < rr
or
Trh (1-it) + (1-,r) < rrsir
Thus it is possible that
rP(1-T() + 6T > rr(l.,r)(2.36)
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Let us next consider replacing a CVA with a GVA. If,
as before, the consumer good industry is rellatively capital-
intensive industry, then there is one thing we can be sure
of: the after-tax rental will rise. It will rise because
not only is the tax rate reduced but the before-tax rental
increases. As in our earlier analysis labor may or may not
be made worse off. The crucial variable in this instance
appears to be the relative size of the share of capital in
the consumer good industry and the share of labor in the
capital good industry. If the former is greater than the
latter the after-tax wage may fall (in the case of Cobb-
Douglas production functions). Conversely, if the capital
good industry is relatively capital intensive then we are
sure that labor will always be made better off. In this
case it is quite possible to reduce or to increase the net
rental. These conclusions can also be generalized to the
case where the CVA is replaced by an IVA.
So far the only way our original rankings could be
altered is for the two sectorsto differ markedly in capital
intensities and for saving to be interest elastic. When
we compare the CVA with a consumption tax this is no longer
true. Recall, that from our analysis of the preceding chapter,
we found that there will be a higher level of consumption
expenditures under a CVA than under a consumption tax. Even
if constant opportunity costs prevail between the two
industries this fact changes our original rankings. To
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show this, let us refer to the tax constraint.
(2.37) TCCc rOr
where the superscript c refers to the consumption tax system
and the superscript r to the CVA system. What we have said
above is that Cc < Cr. We can rewrite (2.37) as
(2.38) TcCc = Tr (Cr+T)
= Tr (Cc+YCc+T)
= TrCc(l+Y+Tc)
whence
r
(2.39) 1c = Tr (1+y)
1-T
In our analysis of a caeteris paribus tax shift we found
that
= T < (l+Y) r
1-T 1-
Therefore, if constant opportunity costs exist, the con-
sumption tax must be ranked below the CVA for both labor
and capital.
If capital intensities differ, we have several cases
to consider. First, if the consumption good industry is
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more capital intensive than the capital good industry, the
net rental will always be higher under a CVA than under a
consumption tax. Labor, on the other hand, may or may not
be worse off; the conditions required to make labor worse
off are similar to those mentioned in the previous cases.
Conversely, if the capital good industry is relatively capital
intensive, the after-tax wage will always be higher under
the GVA than under a consumption tax, whereas the after-tax
rental may or may not be lower.
RECAPITUALATION
With the exception of the consumption tax, we have seen
that the ranking of tax systems according to after-tax wages
given by (I) is valid if constant opportunity costs prevail
or if the capital-good industry is relatively capital intensive.
Amending the ranking (I) to take into account the change of
ranking of the consumption tax, we have
(III) Profits tax > GVA > IVA > CVA > Consumption tax
Similarly, if the consumer-good industry is relatively capital
intensive or if constant opportunity costs exist, the ranking
(II) is valid for after-tax rentals (again with the exception
of the consumption tax). Our amended ranking in this case
is given by:
(IV) IVA > GVA > CVA > Consumption tax > Profits tax
Furthermore, if saving is not highly interest-elastic
and/or capital intensities do not differ markedly,(III) and
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(IV) apply regardless of which industry is more capital
intensive. Thus, it is probable that the rankings given
to us by the caeteris paribus analysis are correct but the
magnitudes of change indicated by it are probably too large.
EFFECTS UPON THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
The determination of the effects of our different tax
systems upon the functional distribution of income is not a
goal in itself but only an intermediate step in determining
the effects of a tax shift upon the size distribution of
income. The usual approach to the latter is to first
determine what changes occur in the functional distribution
of income, and then, on the basis of evidence concerning
factor ownership,infer what the effect will be on the size
distribution of income.
A strict application of this procedure cannot be followed
in our analysis, however. Such a procedure requires that
there be a tradeoff between factor shares when we shift
from one tax system to another. In other words it requires
that the after-tax rental rise when the after-tax wage falls.
This is clearly not the case when we consider substituting
a CVA or consumption tax for another tax system: factor
shares will often move in the same direction. The reason
that this occurs in the case of the CVA is obvious. In our
analysis of factor shares we did not take into account the
allocation of the tax credit granted to new investment.
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Since the tax credit accrues entirely to capital we need
only amend ranking (IV), leaving the ranking for labor unchanged.
No such procedure can solve our problem, in the case of the
consumption tax. It appears that little analysis is possible
because of the absence of a sacrifice' relationship here.
Our amended version of (IV) now reads
(IVa) CVA > IVA > GVA > Consumption tax > Profits tax
The same conditions that were put on (IV) also apply here;
the capital intensities must not differ markedly nor must
saving be highly interest elastic. The rankings (III) and
(IVa), with the exception of the consumption tax, indicate
that a true tradeoff relation exists among our tax systems.
The usual assumption concerning factor ownership is
that capital is relatively concentrated in the hands of a
few whereas wages are relatively equally distributed. Under
this assumption, (IVa) provides us with an index of relative
income equality under our different tax regimes. The CVA
leads to the most unequal distribution while the profits
tax results in the most equal distribution of real income.
LONG-RUN INCIDENCE
In the long run the supply of capital is no longer
inelastic. The stock of capital at any given point of time
depends upon the past time path of savings. The latter- is,
in turn, a function of the time paths of real disposable
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income and interest rates. Tax policy affects both dispos-
able income and the rate of return td savings. However, as
we have previously shown, any system of direct taxation
affects real disposable income in the same way. If saving
is interest inelastic, all systems of direct taxation will
result in the same time path of capital accumulation. Consequent-
ly, gross factor rewards will exhibit the same time path
for any system of direct taxation. In such a case a
comparison of the effects upon net factor rewards of different
forms of direct taxation can be made simply by looking at
rankings (III) and (IV). That is, the long-run rankings are
equal to the short-run rankings.
A consumption tax, on the other hand, will reduce real
disposable income by a greater amount than will a direct
tax of equivalent yield. Hence consumption will be lower
and savings higher under a consumption tax than under a
direct tax. As a result the consumption tax will increase the
rate of capital accumulation relative to the direct tax. To
show this, consider a one-sector economy where the government
taxes and consumes a constant proportion, t, of total output,
Y. Also let the labor force grow exponentially at the rate
n, and let a constant proportion,(l-s), of disposable income,
(Yd), be spent upon consumption by the private sector. Under
any direct tax system, the economy can be described by the
following set of equations:
Y = F(KL) = LF(m,l) = Lf(m)(2.40)
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(2.41) w = F,(K,L) = f(m) - mf'(m)
(2.42) r = Fk(KL) = f'(m)
(2.43) L = Loefnt
(2.44) = s(l-T) Lf(m) - 6K
(2.45) T = _ Y
Equation (2.40) is the production function for our single
output and is assumed to be homogeneous of the first degree.
Equations(2.4,1) and (2.42) are the demand functions for the
factors of production, while (2.43) and (2.44) are the
supply functions.
Solow has shown that the balanced-growth capital-labor
ratio (m ) is given by the solution to the following differential
equation:1
(2.46) i = s(1-7)F(m,l) - (6+n)m = 0
Under a consumption tax, on the other hand, the balanced
growth capital-labor ratio is given by:
(2.47) sF(m,l) - (6+n)m = 0
1R.M. Solow, 'A Contribution to the Theory of Economic
Growth,"' Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXX (Feb. ,1956),
pp. 65-96.
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which can be derived as follows:
C = (1-s) Y( c
S = Y - C - T = Y - C(1+T C)
or
S = sY
Thus in such an economy there is no differece in the rate
of capital accumulation when we shift from a no-government
economy to a government economy when the latter is financed
by a consumption tax. Graphically we can depict (2.46) and
(2.47) as
Figure (3)
(lyV±
+ -- A)IF
Clearly, the gross wage will be higher and the gross
rental lower at mc than at . An interesting question is
whether the after-tax wage is higher at mc than at md. The
answer depends upon the elasticity of substitution of the
function F. We can expect to answer in the negative for those
- U -
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cases where the elasticity of substitution is high and in
the affirmative if the elasticity is low. Our answer will
also depend upon the type of direct tax which is imposed.
The higher the rate of tax on labor relative to that on capital,
the more likely that the net wage at m exceeds that at m
We will compare the consumption tax with the CVA since the
two are often compared, We will also assume that F is Cobb-
Douglas because the latter is often proposed as empirically
relevant. Under these assumptions the real net wage in
balanced growth under the consumption tax is given by:
(2.48) Wc lc )(1-0) mc -
1+
S-r c-
with T
For a CVA we have
(2.49) Wr - n+6
with
r T
1-s+Ts
It can be shown that as long as s < P, wc > w r That
is, as long as the rate of savings is less than or equal to
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the gross share of capital, labor is made better off in the
long run by substituting a consumption tax for a CVA. It
should be noted that s=P is the (golden rule' ratge of
savings; ie. that rate of savings at which balanced growth
per-capita consumption is at its maximum. Empirically, s is
less than 0 in the U.S.
If we compare the real net wage in balanced growth
under the profits tax (wv) with w" we find that the former
always exceeds the latter if F is Cobb-Douglas. The balanced
growth net wage under the profits tax is given by
-- 1-6'1-(2.50) w1 = (-~) ( )n+
It can easily be shown that wP > wc so long as 0 < (1-P);
ie. the gross share of capital is less than the gross share
of labor.
What can we say about the return to capital in the
above cases? In the long-run, the correct measure of the
welfare of capitalists is not net rental but ths--rate of
return earned on their investments. Since the rate of return
on investment is equal to the gross rental minus depreciation
for both the CVA and consumption tax, it is clear that capital
will be worse off under a consumption tax than under a CVA.
Furthermore, the rate of return will be higher under a
consumption tax than under a profits tax. To show this
simply compare rates of return in balanced growth;
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(2.51) i = (+b) - 6
(2.52) iP = p(Elh) (t )-6S
Since 1/0 > 1 it is clear that ic > p
If one doesn' t feel that the Cobb-Douglas form violently
misrepresents reality and if the rate of return does not
affect the desire to save, the following ranking of taxes
will hold for the real net wage.
Profits tax > Consumption tax > CVA
The ranking for capital is given by
CVA > Consumption tax > Profits tax
Furthermore, the direct taxes can be ranked according
to their short-run ranking. That is,
Profits tax > GVA > IVA > CVA
for labor, and
CVA > IVA > GVA > Profits tax
for capital. The latter two rankings hold for any production
functions.
VARIABLES SAVINGS RATE
Thus far we have considered only the case where saving
is interest-inelastic. We must now consider the case where
the rate of capital accumulation is positively related to the
rate of return of investment. Under a direct tax system,
the balanced growth capital-labor ratio is given by the
solution to
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(2.53) l= s(i)(1-)F(m,1) - (6+n)m = 0
where
i = g(m)
such that
< 0
Clearly, the form of g depends upon the type of direct tax
system which is in effect. For example, g will yield a
higher i and consequently a higher s for any given m under a
CVA than under a GVA. This can be depicted graphically as
follows:
Figure (4)
Let curve A represent the system under a CVA and similarly
let curve B represent the system under a GVA. Note, first
of all, that the CVA yields a higher balanced-growth capital-
labor ratio (mr) than does the GVA (me). This is the consequence
of the fact that the rate of capital accumulation is higher
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under the CVA than under the GVA. Notice, also, that the
two curves are identical up to the capital-labor ratio mo;
now m0 is that capital-labor ratio which yields the maximum
savings ratiQ under the GVA. This maximum is at most one
and is reached at a larger capital-labor ratio under the
CVA. mi, on the other hand, is that capital-labor ratio
which yields a zero savings rate under the GVA. Under the
CVA a zero savings rate-is achived at an m > m 1 .
We can conclude from the above that the higher the rate
of return for a given capital-labor ratio the higher will be
the balanced growth capital-labor ratio. We have already
ranked our direct tax systems according to their effect upon
the rate of return. The ranking is
CVA > IVA > GVA > Profits tax
This ranking, along with the above, implies that the level
of gross (before tax) wages will be higher and gross rentals
lower in balanced growth, as we pass from a profits tax to
a CVA tax. It is clear.that the tax systems which reduce
short-run after-tax wages to the greatest extent are precisely
those which give rise to the largest gross wage in the
long-run.
The question, then, immediately comes to mind as to
whether tax systems which are relatively harsh on labor, in
the short-run, can make labor better off in the long-run.
Indeed, this will.be an important consideration when deciding
whether or not to replace a profits tax with a value-added tax.
If it can be shown that a temporary sacrifice on the
part of labor will result in a higher level of take-home pay
in the fature, then we have a powerful argument against
those who reject the value-added tax on distributional
grounds. If, on the other hand, it can be shown that the
lot of labor will not be improved, the proponents of value-
added taxation will have to seek its justification on other
grounds. Economic growth may be a goal of society but it
may be hard sell at the expense of distributional consid-
erations. 1
GVA vs PROFITS TAX
The first case that we will consider is a comparison
of a GVA and a profits tax. In order to refresh the mind
of the reader, the model to be examined is given below:
(2.54) Y = F(KL) = LF(m,l) = Lf(m)
(2.55) w = FL (KL) = f(m) - mf /(m)
(2.56) r = Fk(KL) = f'(m)
(2.57) --w = w(1-T+yT)
(2.58) r = r(l-t)
1R.A.Musgrave, ('Growth With Equity," American Economic
Review, Vol. LIII (May, 1963), pp. 323-33.
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(2.59) L = Loent
(2.60) I = s(i)(1-1)Lf(m) - 6K
(2.61) i = 6
(2.62) T(rK+wL) - ytwL = T(rK+wL)
Equations (2.54) - (2.56), (2.59) - (2.60), are as they were
before. Equations (2.57), (2.58) and (2.61) are simply
definitional equations, defining the net wage, net rental
and rate of interest respectively. Equation (2.62) is our
tax constraint which states that taxes shall be maintained
at a constant proportion,t, of total output. y serves as
a shift parameter. Under a GVA y = 0 and under a profits
tax.y = 1.
The system of equations (2.54) - (2.62) will yield a
solution, given an initial capital stock, for any time period
in the future. To arrive at the balanced growth solution,
we merely set K/K = n and solve. Doing this we find that
the above system reduces to
(2.63) w - (l-t+y-r)(f(iu-mf (m)) = 0
(2.64) n + 6 - s(i)(1-7) m) =0
i + 6 -f' (1-T) = 0(2.*65)
-I
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(2.66) (T yt(1 - = 0
In order to determine whether shifting from a GVA to a profits
tax will increase the net wage, we will evaluate the partial
derivative of w with respect to y, in the range 0 < y _ 1.
If this partial derivative is positive then w is higher
under the profits tax than under the GVA, and vice versa.
In general we find that the sign of ---- depends upon
the elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of saving
with respect to the interest rate. The higher the elasticity
of substitution and the lower the elasticity of saving, the
more likely that w is higher under the profits tax than
under the GVA. In particular, if the production function is
Cobb-Douglas and the rate of profits tax is less than-,a half,
then > 0. These are sufficient but not necessary condi-
tions. This result can be arrived at in another way without
the restriction on the profits tax. When we replace a profits
tax with a GVA it must be that the rate of interest is lower
under the former than under the latter. Ie.
(2.67) rP(1-TP) - 6 < rg (1-7) - 6
or
OmP (1-Tr ) < Pmg (1 .-r)
This reduces to 1
(2.68) M > (
-76-
In order for the net wage to be higher under the GVA than
under the profits tax, it must be that
(2.69) W (1-T) > wp
or
P <
Combining (2.68) and (2.69) we have
but
23
(lTP)~ i P + - 60
Thus (2.68) and (2.69) are contradictory. This means that
the net wage under the profits tax must always be higher
than the net wage under tpie GVA when the production function
is Cobb-Douglas.
GVA vs. IVA
The model to be examined in this case is the same as
the preceding model except for the following changes:
(2.57a) = (1-'r)w
(2.58a) r = r(l-T) + yt6
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(2.62a) T(rK+wL) - yt6K = T(rK+wL)
Under the GVA, y = 0, and under the IVA, y = 1. In balanced
growth this system can be reduced to:
(2.70) w - (1-T)[f(m) - mfl (m)] = 0
(2.71) n + 6 - S(i)(1-7) = 0
(2.72) i + 6 - f(l-T) - yT6 = 0
(2.73) (T - T) - ty m) 0
If we take the partial derivative of this system with
respect to y, in the range 0 < y < 1, we find that -
is strictly negative, regardless of the elasticity of sub-
stitution and the elasticity of the saving rate. Therefore,
by permitting economic depreciation under a valpe-added tax
we can only make labor worse off, both in the long-run and in
the short-run.. Finally, in the case of Cobb-Douglas
production functions, we have established that the long-run
net wage can be ranked as follows
Profits tax > GVA > IVA
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CVA vs. IVA
This turns out to be the most difficult case to evaluate,
even if the production function is Cobb-Douglas. The use of
a shift paramater does not succeed here. The two taxes are
identical in every respect, save one. The CVA permits
depreciation to be taken instantaneously whereas the IVA
allows economic depreciation. It has already been shown
that the CVA results in a higher level of savings than an
IVA. We will now show that if the production function is
Cobb-Douglas and if the interest elasticity of saving is
sufficiently high, the CVA will result in a.higher balanced
growth net wage than will the IVA.
Furthermore, the relative size of the net wage, under
the two tax systems, is intimately connected with the rate
of growth of the labor force. It will be shown that, if the
labor force is stationary and the production function is
Cobb-Douglas, then the net wage will be higher under a CVA
than under an IVA.
When the labor force is not growing, balanced growth
corresponds to a stationary state. In a stationary state,
gross investment is equal to depreciation. Thus, if we
switch from an IVA to a CVA the tax rate on wages would
remain constant(initially). 1
1Once the CVA has been introduced, however, the rate of
return will rise. Thus, for a certain period, net investment
will be positive before settling back to zero. In this new
stqtionary state, the capital stock will be larger and hence
depreciation will be larger. Because of the latter the tax rate
on labor will have to adjust.
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Under taese conditions the tax constraint for both
systems can be written as follows:
T(rK+wL) - T6K = -T(rK+wL)
or
(2.74) x = 1-6 K/Y
From the form of (2.74) it can be observed that the tax rate
on labor income is a function solely of the capital output
ratio. If the CVA and IVA resulted in the same equilibrium
capital-output ratio they would have exactly the same tax
rate. However, we can express K/Y as
(27) Ky K L - i(2.75) K/Y = Y f(m)
Furthermore,
f(m) - Mf1(m) > 0
m [f (m) ]2
We have already established that m will be higher under a
CVA than under an IVA; hence the balanced-growth tax rate will
be higher under a CVA than under an IVA.
We can write the net wage under both tax systems as
(2,76)
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Substituting from (2.74) for T we have
(2.77) w = [ 1 - ] (1-s)
which'is a function of m alone. Since m is higher under a
CVA than under an IVA all we need do is evaluate .
am w _ (.l-t) - (1- )[1
6 m ~[1-6m l]2
[(1-7)- 6(1-0)26 6
+ [1_6 n(1-0) 2
The second term of this expression is clearly positive.
A sufficient condition for the entire expression to be
positive is that
(2.78) (1-1)0f (i) - 6 I > 0
But we know that in a stationary state
(2.79) (1-T)sf(M) - 61 = 0
so that (2.78) is satisfied as long as 0 > s. Another
interpretation can be put on the inequality (2.78). The
expression (l is equal to the gross rental on capital.
Under a CVA the net rental on capital is given by
which is less than (1-7)sm because T > 7. The inequality
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(2.78) is satisfied as long as the after-tax rental exceeds
the depreciation on-the equipment.
One we allow the labor force to grow, on the other hand
the expression for the net wage under the CVA is given by
(2.80) w =[1-
- (6+n)(l
For any given m, (2.80) yields a lower net wage than does
(2.77). Furthermore, this difference increases the larger
is the rate of growth of laborn. Therefore, the faster
the rate of growth of labor the greater the difference between
the rates of tax under the CVA and IVA, and the smaller the
difference between the balanced growth capital-labor ratios
of the two tax systems.
There is little we can say, in general, about the long-
run outcome of shifting from a CVA to an IVA. The best we
can do is give some indication of the increase in saving rate
necessary to make labor better off in the long-run under the
CVA than under the IVA. Before we make such estimates, however,
we will compare the CVA with a GVA and a profits tax. If
we find, for reasonable values of s, that the CVA increases
the net wage, then we can make inferences about the CVA
vs. the IVA.
CVA vs. PRCFITS TAX
Given a Cobb-Douglas production function, the relative
size of the balanded growth net wage under these tax regimes
- - -1 ON 01111 1 -1 1 - - "I.- - - . - 1 11 __
is a function of the interest elasticity of saving. Henoe,
we can compare the solution for the net wage given by each
tax system and from this we can infer what size increase- in
the saving rate is necessary to make the CVA yield a higher
net wage than the profits tax. The balanced growth solution
for the net wage under the CVA is given by:
(2,81) = (1-p)[ n+6 s r[(-)(1-sr
11-sr(l
whereas under the profits tax we have
(2.82) w = (1-p) n+6
(1-T)
where sr and
profits tax,
(2.83)
SP are the rates of saving under the CVA and
repectively. Their ratio yields
= [s
r5
[ 1-'sr (l)
(1.-)(1-sr)
Suppose
sp = (1-y)s (O<zy~l)
then
__ p
r (1-y) ~4
~r
w
(1-7) (1-s)
If we expand (1-y) in Taylor series and ignore all terms
but first two, (2.84) becomes
(2.84)
1-P
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(2.85) [ 1- 0 )Y] 1-Sr(l-T)
w
now (2.85) is less than 1 as
(2.86) - ( y[1-sr(1-)] < 0
It is usually assumed that 0/1-0 is in the neighborhood of
1/3. Hence (2.86) becomes
(2.87) 3 - y + < 0
The solution of (2.87) for t, given different values of sr
and t, are shown in the following table.
TABLE 2.
Solutions to the Inequality (2.87)
sr
sP l-Y
sr
0 .1 .2 0 .1 .2
.05 .15 .17 .18 .18 .20 .23
.10 .30 .33 .38 .43 .50 .60
.15 .45 .50 .54 .82 1.00 1.21
.20 .60 .65 .71 1.50 1.88 2.50
.25 .75 .80 .90 3.00 4.29 8.50
It appears that in the relevant range of values for the
parameter (T > .10, sr > .20), a substantial increase in
savings is necessary to make labor better off under the CVA.
Also note that these are not the increases in saving rates
which are necessary initially but the increases in saving
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rate from balanced growth path to balanced growth path.
Intially, (ie. when the tax shift is first made), the saving
rate would have to increase by a much greater amount because
the rate of return in balanced growth is much lower than
when the tax change is made (ie. because the capital-labor
ratio is higher in balanced growth).
To show this, consider the relative size of the rate
of return (including depreciation) under the two tax systems
in balanced growth:
(2.88) Rr s..1 1-Y
RP sr 1-7/0 1-7/0
When we first made the tax switch we had
(2.89) r 1
Thus
Rr
Rr
The balanced growth rate of return is y olower than the
initial rate of return. If saving is a linear and proportional
function of the rate of return we would expect the saving
rate of have fallen by y%.
Ie.
sr (1-y)
r
so
Thus the saving rate would have had to increase by nearly
double of what we have calculated in Table (II), when the
- I - - I -
___ 
____A
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tax change was first put into effect. It appears extremely
remote that we could ever witness an increase in the saving
rate of the magnitude which is necessary to make labor
better off under a OVA than under a profits tax.
CVA vs. GVA
The balanced growth solution for net wages under the GVA
is given by
(2.90) w = (1-7)[ ] -g (1-7)
1-t
If we again make the assumption that sg = (1 -y)sr and take
the ratio of wg to wr we find
(2.91) -= (1-y) [ 1-s 1>
wr 1-Sr(l_)
as
(2.92) 3 sr - y[lsr(l)] > 0
The solutions of this inequality for y, given different values
5r adrof s and T, are easily seen to be s times the solutions
fory in the preceding section. These rates of increase
of s 'seem quite modest in comparison with those of the
previous section, However, we must think in relative terms.
In the preceding case we compared a profits tax to a CVA;
we should expect larger increases in s in this case. Instead
of comparing absolute changes in s we should compare the
percentage increase in s with the percentage increase in
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rates of return. If we assume, for simplicity' s sake, that
savings is related to the rate of return on investment gross
of depreciation (ie. i+6), then the elasticity of the
saving rate with respect to the rate of return is given by:
(2,93)
-- 1
R r l-y
where Rr _ r + 6 and Rg = ig + 6.
Assume that this elasticity is equal to unity. Then
(2.93) yields
(2.94) y= - 1
1/2t
If we substitute
we find that the
this value of y into the inequality (2.92)
inequality holds as long as
s r > 1
Given that x
satisfied as
large as .15
Furthermore,
elasticities
and not of R.
< .25 this implies that the inequality is
s > .15. We would expect sr to be as least as
since this is what it is presently equal to.
the inequality is satisfied for even larger
of saving rates if saving is a function of i
--- "NIMM95 - .- -.1-1- 1 1 1- . -- - ---- -I--- --
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Empirical evidence seems to indicate that savings
elasticities are appreciably less than one. This leads me
to doubt that the lot of labor could be improved in the
long run by substituting a CVA for a GVA.
VARIABLE SUPPLY OF LABOR
So far we have assumed that labor dffers its services for
whatever price it can get. If we abandon this assumption
and assume that the supply 6f labor is a function of the
real wage, our entire analysis may be turned on its head.
In the above analysis we have argued that the relatively
capital oriented taxes such as the profits tax and the GVA
tend to reduce the level of savings more than the relatively
labor oriented taxes such as the IVA and GVA. It was argued
that the latter taxes result in a higher rate of capital
accumulation and hence a higher level of per-capita income.
Once we allow labor to vary in supply, this may no longer be
true. There appears to be two major forces counteracting
this effect. First, the labor oriented taxes-will result in
a smaller voluge of physical output than the capital oriented
taxes because of a smaller labor force. Secondly, with less
labor to cooperate with it, the rental on capital will be
lower, thus inhibiting the desire to save and invest. These
forces could be so strong as to make the labor oriented taxes
result in a lower rate of capital accumulation than the
capital oriented taxes. What the net effect will be is
quite uncertain.
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SUMMARY
We had set out to discover the effects of our various
tax systems upon the distribution of income. We discovered
that little can be said in general. In the short-run,
certain of the direct effects of a tax upon a factorls
income can be alleviated somewhat by shifts in the allocation
of factors over the different producing sectors. This force
is assumed to be too weak to overcome the ranking of the tax
systems under the assumption that constant opportunity costs
exist between industries. First, the saving rate does not
appear to be highly sensitive to changes in the rate of
interest and secondly factor intensities do not differ
dramatically between consumption goods and capital goods.
In the long-run it was discovered that the tax systems
which reduced the take-home wage most in the short run also
give rise to the highest before-tax wage in the long run.
The object of our analysis was to determine whether or not
the take-home wage would also rise. If we assume a Cobb-
Douglas production function then the answer is no. In
particular it is doubtful that the substitution of a value-
added tax, of any type, for a profits tax could prove
beneficial to labor in the long-run. The proponents of
a value-added tax must seek their justification elsewhere.
CHAPTER III
AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION
In our previous analysis, we assumed that the economy
conformed to the pattern of behavior of a classical full
employment model. In such an economy, the profit and utility
maximizing conditions are always satisfied. Furthermore,
in response to a change in underlying conditions, the economy
moves instantaneously from one equilibrium to the next; the
economy is constantly in full employment equilibrium.
Because of our assumption of inelastic factor supplies,
the sole determinant of the rate of investment and hence of
the entire future time path of the economy is the rate of
saving. Saving serves as the "engine of the economy. Clearly
then, the only way tax structure can affect such an economy
is through its effects upon consumption behavior.
In what follows, we shall drop some of the assumptions
of the classical model. Instead, because of factors such as
wage and price rigidities, market imperfections, adjustment
problems caused by the structure of time lags, the liquidity
trap, etc., we assume that the economy is not continuously
at full employment. We can also assume that either the
economy does not automatically tend towards full employment
or if it does that the process takes time.
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In this economy, the profit and utility maximizing
conditions do not hold at every point of time. Instead, they
represent "target'' levels towards which the participants in
theeconomy are always striving. Thus, the conditions
provided us by the classical model do have validity but only in
the long-run sense; they provide the trend line around which
the economy oscillates.
In this new and more realistic model of the economy, the
tax structure can affect behavior other than by influencing
the rate of saving. In the first place, the tax structure
can exert significant influence upon the short-run stability
of the economy. For example, it is often argued, and
probably correctly, that a poll tax results 'in more cyclical
instability than an income tax. Secondly, because the rate
of investment is no longer constrained by the level of savings
(except in the meaningless ex-post sense), the tax structure
can directly affect the level of investment. In the -classical
model, investment was determined by the level of savings; thus
the only way government could increase investment was by
increasing savings. In the new model, on the other hand, a tax
policy directed towards increasing savings might well result
in a lower level of investment.
The balance of this paper will be devoted to exploring
these two aspects of tax structure. Specifically, we will
attempt to determine the effect of substituting a value-added
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tax for a corporate profits tax upon the short-run
stability of the eccnomy and upon the timing and level of
investment expenditures. In this chapter, we shall deal with
the former whereas the latter will be discussed in the next
two chapters.
AUTOMATIC STABILIZATION
In a recentarticle, Otto Eckstein asserts that the net
effect of replacing a corporate profits tax withavalue-
added tax is a reduction in the built-in -stability of the
economic system. His reasoning proceeds as follows: corporate
profits are perhaps the most volatile component of national
income--being relatively high in prosperity and relatively
low in recession. As a consequence, corporate profits
taxes also vary significantly over the course of the business
cycle--and in a countercyclical pattern. As a matter of
fact, corporate profits taxes are responsible for most of
the variation in total government receipts over the business
cycle.
The base of the value-added tax, on the other hand, is
much more stable over the course of the busine~s cycle;
corporate profits comprise only a small portion of the tax
base. Therefore, government receipts would be more stable
under the value-added tax than under the corporate profits
1 Otto Eckstein, "European and U.S. Tax Structure," in
The Role of Direct aid Indirect Taxes in the Federal Revenue
System, Brokkings Insitution, (Priceton:Princeton University
Press, 1964), p. 248.
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tax. On this basis, Eckstein argues that, to substitute a
value-added tax for a corporate profits tax, would be to
reduce the automatic stabilizing power of the tax system.
In what follows, we will investigate this proposition.
Our first task is to define precisely what we mean by
the built-in-flexibility of a tax system. The most obvious
definition is the change in tax receipts which results from
a given change in national income. Ie.
where S is an index of the built-in-flexibility of a tax
structure. The larger S, the greater the build-in-flexibility
of the tax system. According to this definition, the built-
in-flexibility of the profits tax is greater than that of the
value-added tax. To see this we need simply calculate
AT/AY for each of these tax systems. For the value-added
tax (IVA) we have
T = vy
hence
AT =-v
Under a profits tax we have
T = -r
(.2) AT A
In order to provide equal revenue, T. must satisfy
tPn = TY
Thus equation (3.2) becomes
AT v An Y v
where e is the elasticity of profits with respect to output. As
Ecetkin has argued, and as we will see below, this elasticity
is greater than one. Thus the built-in-flexibility of the
profits tax is greater than that of the value-added tax.
Before we can relate the built-in-flexibility of a tax
system to its automatic stabilizing power, we must first define
what we mean by stability. As Brown has pointed out, there is
no obvious definition. This can be seen by the use of the
following diagram
Figure (5)
lE. Cary Brown, "The Static Theory of Automatic Fiscal
Stabilization" Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXIII
(October, 195 ), pp. 427-40.
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Curves A and B denote the cyclical behavior of the economy
under two tax systems, A and B. Tax system B gives rise to
cycles of greater amplitude but of lower periodicity than tax
system A. Which system provides the most stability? Clearly
we cannot answer without some notion of the social welfare
function.
Suppose we sidestep this problem by assuming that the tax
structure which yields the lowest sum of absolute deviations
from the trend line is the most desirable. Can we go directly
from the size of AT/AY to the degree of automatic stability
o$ a tax structure? The answer is no. We must first relate
the change in taxes to changes in expenditure. There is no
reason to suppose that a dollar increase in taxes under a
consumption tax will result in the same reduction in private
expenditure as a dollar increase in a tax on savings. To
state the problem mQre precisely we are interested in
A Y AT 
where AE is the change in expenditure. Even though a tax
structure A yields a higher -L than tax structure B, thereAY
is no reason to suppose that -E will be the same under A
than under B. Thus, it is conceivable that the value-added
tax would provide a lower A- than wQuld a profits tax.
Even if we have ascertained that AE/AY is lower under a
profits tax than under a value-added tax there is no guarantee
that the former provides greater automatic stability than the
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latter. Phillips and others have shown that the stability
of the economy is very sensitive to the structure of time lags
in the economy. There is no guarantee that the tax systems
which result in the lowest AE/AY will also produce the greatest
amount of stability. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
the lag structure will remain constant as we shift from one
tax structure to another.
In order to properly determine the effect of shifting
from a corporate profits tax to a value-added tax upon the
stability of the economy, we would have to estimate an econome-
tric model of the U. S., using the correct lag structure, and
then make the heroic assumption that our parameters and time
lage remain constant when we impose the value-added tax.
This is a formidable task which we have neither the time nor
the resources to undertake. Instead we shall have to be content
with a much more modest approach. We will study and compare
the automatic stabilizing power of our two tax structures
within the framework of the static Keynesian model. While it
is true that this approach sheds little, if any, light upon
the actual stability effects of the tax substitution, it is
of some interest from a purely theoretical viewpoint. More
importantly, the results of the static model can be easily
translated into an estimate of the impact multiplier of an
autonomous disturbance under the two tax regimes. While impact
1 1A.,,W. Phillips, 'Stabilization Policy in a Closed
Economy, Economic Journal, Vol. LXVII (June, 1957) pp. 265-77
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multipliers may tell us little about the overall stability of
the economy, they provide us with a measure of the short-run
sensitivity of the economy to random shocks. The smaller the
impact multiplier the less the economy will deviate from its
equilibrium position in the very short-run. This dampening
effect may be quite important to policy-makers who could bring
into play discretionary measures to offset the random shock,
but could do this only with a short time lag. Our work in
this section is based largely upon an article by E. Cary Brown
entitled "The Static Theory of Automatic Fiscal Stabilization.
CONSUMPTION MODEL
In order to assess the impact of a change in tax regime
upon the automatic stability of the economy, it is not enough
to measure the change in the pattern of tax receipts which
result, but we must also relate the latter to changes in the
expenditure. To begin with let us assume that
(3-3) a = (d
where C is real consumption expenditures, and Yd, real
disposable income. We assume that the supply of output, Y, is
infinitely elastic at current market prices so that (3.3)
holds in money terms as well as in real terms. Also assume
for the moment that investment expenditure is exogenous and
1Brown, op. cit.
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that government expenditure is constant. Under these assump-
tions, gross national product ( we will abstract from deprecia-
tion) can be written as:
(3.4) Y = C(Yd) + A
where A represents all exogenous expenditure. Brown suggests
that, as a measure of the automatic stability of the economy,
we use:
1 ~dYd(3.5) F = dA/dY = 1 - C'(Yd) dY
F is that amount of change in autonomous expenditure required
to raise income by one dollar. Clearly the larger is F the
more stable is the system. F is simply the reciprocal of the
familiar income multiplier.
Under any direct tax system, we can write (3.4) more
explicitly as
(3.6) Y = C(Y-T-Sc) + A
where T is the level of taxation and Sc represents corporate
savings. We can also rewrite (3.5) as
(3.7) F = 1 - C' - [1 - d - ]dSc dnn.didwe tdn d prdY
where ni is corporate profits before tax andnn profits after
-98-
tax. It will be assumed that before tax profits are an
increasing function of output, such that $ < 1. Furthermore,
we assume that corporate saving is an increasing function of
after-tax profits.
If the tax system is a corporate profits tax (T = Tpn),
then equation (3.7) yields
(3.8) F7 = 1 - C. [(l-1rP)(l-i.S) + TE(1-y)]
where L=d and S =dY dn
If, on the other hand, a GVA (=IVA) exists and the tax is borne
by the factors of production in proportion to their earnings,
F becomes
(3.9) Fg = 1 - C' - (1-T)(1-ps)
Our next step will be to evaluate F6 - Fn. If this expression
is positive then the value-added tax results in greater
stability than the profits tax. Clearly if 19 = Tg then
Fg > F1 . In general, however, tP > Tg since the taxes are of
equal revenue. Specifically,
(3.10) TE = T= < 1
substituting from (3.10) into (3.9) we find
F( = 1 - C' - (1-OTP)(1-y1S)(3.11)
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Now Fg - F' > 0 if
(3.12) S >
Clearly if S> yp, (3.12) is satisfied. It is easy to see that
0 > y4 if the elasticity of corporate profits with respect to
income is less than one. Ie.,
dir Y
dY e n
Thus a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for Eckstein's
argument to be correct is that e > 1. Rewriting (3.12) in
terms of elasticies we have
(3.13) S > (1 -
What has been determined empirically about the sizes of
the parameters in (3.13)? In the long-run, the share of
profits in output has remained basically constant (ie. E = 1).
In a static world, where adjustments occur instantaneously,
it must be that the value-added tax provides more stability
than the profits tax. The reason is obvious. Because the
share in output of profits is constant, the built-in-flexibility
of the profits tax is no higher than that of the value-added
tax. On the other hand, retained earnings absorb a greater
percentage of the change in taxes under the profits tax than
under the value-added tax. Hence, disposable income will
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change more under the profits tax than under the value-added
tax.
That a static framework for the analysis of stability is
entirely inadequate is quickly brought out by the above analysis.
The static model is incapable of incorporating into the
analysis the fact that, in the short-run, profits tend to vary
substantially mqre than output. As a consequence, the differ-
ence in the built-in-flexibility of the two tax systems is
ignored. Therefore, in the analysis that follows we shall
ignore the static model and concentrate instead upon estimating
and comparing the first quarter response of the economy to
a change in exogenous expenditure. That is, F now becomes the
reciprocal of the impact multiplier.
Returning to the inequality (3.13), we find that Lintner,
and more recently Brittain,2 have maie estimates of S. The
form of the equation used to estimate S is given by
(3.14) Dt = a + (1-S)Xt- 1 + bDt-1
where D is quarterly dividends and X a measure of the pool of
funds which might be used for dividend purposes. In the
Lintner formulation X was profits net of both taxes and
depreciation. Brittain, on the other hand, argues that because
1John Littner, "Distribution of Incomes of Corporations
Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes," American
Economic Review, Vol. XLIV (May, 1956), pp. 97-113
2John A Brittain,"The Tax Structure and Corporate Dividends
Policy," American Economic Review, Vol LIV (May, 1964), pp.272-87.
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of the arbitrary nature of depreciation allowances, profits
net of taxes but gross of depreciation should be employed.
He argues, further, that it is the total supply of internal
funds which influences dividends rather than book profits.
Brittain estimated both of these models for the period 1942-
1960 and found S = .83 for the Lintner formulation and .85
for his own formulation. Both parameter estimates were sign-
ificant at the 17. level. It appears from these estimates that
we may safely assume S to be in the neighborhood of 5/6.
Plugging this value of S into (3.13) we obtain
(315) E < 6 g
as a necessary and sufficient condition for the value-added
tax to be more stable that the profits tax.
There has been no empirical estimates of e as such.
However, C. L. Schultze has estimated ; 1 from a knowledge of
y we can construct E. Now p is the product of two terms.
AY &Y
c by
where Tc is corporate product and Y is GNP. Schultze estimated
the following equation for corporate profits:
1C. L. Schultze, "Short Run Movement of Income Shares,
The Behavior Qf Tncome Shares, National Bureau of Economic
Research, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964)
pp. 143-82
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Y cYckTY-(3.16) C a + b C
where Yck is the capacity level of the output of the corporate
sector. Schultze hypothesized that the short-run share of
corporate profits in corporate product is the sum of the
long-run share of profits plus a term which reflects devia-
tions from optimum output levels. From (3.16) we can calculate
Att/AYc'
(5.1') a + b
c
In the post war period Schultze found a = .28 and b = .20.
Thus (a+b) ; 1/2.
Similarly, Schultze estimated the share of corporate
product in GNP.
Y CY 
- Yk
(3.18) Yc = c + d Y
where Y-Yk is the departure of GNP from normal. Schultze
took as normal the trend level of the peaks of GNP over the
post-war period. From (3.18) we can calculate
(5.19) Ay c+ dAY
The value of c was estimated at 577 and the d was estimated
at .2%. Thus c+d = 3/5. Multiplying (c+d)(a+b) we obtain
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1' = = 3/5 - 1/2 = 3/10
We can also calculate P from Schultze% s estimates.
Remember that a stood for the long-run ratio of profits
to corporate product while c represented the long-run ratio
of corporate product to gross national product. Hence
P = - = 
=a-b 
.15
c
Thus s = = 2 and the inequality (3.15) becomes
6 _2 < 1+.75 3'
which, even after allowing for errors of estimation, appears
to be true. It appears, therefore, that in this simplified
model of the economy the value-added tax has a smaller impact
multiplier (a larger F) than the profits tax.
Before leaving this simplified model we should inquire
whether a CVA would promote greater stability than the GVA
(which was discussed above). Recall that the difference
between a CVA and GVA is that the former permits the
deduction of investment expenditure whereas the latter does
not. If the increase in exogenous expenditure is made by the
government or by some other non-investment source, the value
of F under the CVA is giver* by:
Fc = 1 - C -* (1-Tc) (l-ts)(3.20)
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Now (3.20) is of the same form as F6. Note, however, that
Tc > *T8 because the base of the CVA is narrower than that
of the GVA (by the amount of the investment credit). Thus
Fc > F9.
If, on the other hand, the increase in exogenous expen-
diture is caused by a rise in investment the form of (3.20)
must change to take into account the increase in tax credit
which will result. Ie.
(3.20a) F - - c (1'T)(lus) < FC
1 + C . Tc (1-S)
If we compare F c we find that
F c> F
if
1-S (1-C) (1-yS) 1+Tc c
i= Y
Empirical evidence suggests that C' is in the neighborhood
of .6 while the ratio of business investment expenditure
to GNP has been about .08(for the period 1950 - 1962).2
1E Gary Brown, A Ando, R. Solow, J Karaken, ' Lags
in Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Stabilization Polidies'.,
Commision on Money + Credit, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1963), p. 124.
2U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business,
(July 1952 - 1963), tables 1,3'7.
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We find that, as long as tc is less than one, this inequality
i. violated., Whether or not the CVA is more stable than the
GVA, then, depends upon the source of the increase in
exogenous expenditures. If the source is investment expendi-
ture, the GVA has a smaller impact multiplier, whereas if the
source is government expenditure the CVA is more stable.
Finally, if we consider the imposition of a flat-rate
no exemption income tax we will find that the resulting F is
of the same form as a GVA except that a higher rate of tax
is necessary under the former because it exempts retained
earnings. Thus, the income tax is more stable than the GVA.
Furthermore, it should be the case that the income tax is less
stable than the CVA because gross business investment usually
exceeds corporate savings; this implies a higher rate of tax
under the CVA than under the income tax.
MODEL WITH INDUCED INVESTMENT
We will now consider a model where a portion of invest-
ment expenditures is a function of the level of output. There
are many forms which this function could assume but we will
concern ourselves with the "flexible accelerator' approach.
Under this approach, investment is assumed to be equal to the
difference between the actual and the desired capital stock,
times a reaction coefficient which dictates the speed at
which the adjustment is to take place. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the desired capital stock is proportional to out-
put in the current period. This can be expressed algebraically
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t = I = b(K d-)
with
Kd = cY
Thus
I = aY - bK
If we are at less than full employment this hypothesis
is questionable, particularly with respect to plant and
equipment expenditure. Nevertheless, there may still be
bottlenecks which have to be resolved and inventories which
have to keep pace with sales. In any case, most short-run
models of investment include some capacity measure (which is
itself an accelerator concept). Under this assumption we can
write GNP as
(3.21) Y = G- + aY - bZ + A
Furthermore,
(3.22)
under any direct tax system F becomes
F = 1 -C -(1 - d - dc -a
If we calculate F for the profits tax, income tax and GVA we
find that the analysis of the preceding section holds. Ie.
F < Fg < PI
where
a = b-c
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F= 1 - C E[(l-TP)(l-tS) + TP(l-yi)] - a
F= 1 - C o[(l-T6)(l-yS)] - a
F' = 1 - C -[(1-Ti)(1-yS)] - a
It is easy to see that the F s of this section are simply the
F's of the preceding section minus a. Thus, the rankings of
the tax systems are unaffected. The reason is obvious.
Because investment is a function of output alone, the relation-
ship between a change in exogenous expenditure and investment
is unaffected by tax structure. Under each of our tax systems
the change in investment will be proportional to the change
in output. If, on the other hand, investment were a function
of internal funds, tax structure would be a crucial variable
because each tax system affects internal funds in a different
way. We shall consider this case in the next section.
When we consider a CVA, however, the form of F must
change somewhat in order to take into account the increase in
tax credit which accompanies the increase in induced invest-
ment. This force, however, is not so strong as to make the
CVA less stable than the GVA. To show this, consider the
expression for F under the CVA when the increase in exogenous
expenditures occurs through some non-investment source.
Fc = 1 - C / [(1-c)(l-yS) + tc(l-S)a] - a(3.2 3)
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Comparing F with F6 we have:
(3.24) Fc - F9 = C -[(Tc-T6)(1-wS) - Tc(l-S)a]
with
Tc(Y-I) =gy
or
T = rc(l-a-i a)
where
SbKia
Rewriting (3.24) we find
(3.24a) Fc - Fg = C' -[Tc( a +a)(l-yS) - Tca(1-S)]
Clearly for any S such that 0 < S < 1, Fc - F9 > 0.
Even though the introduction of induced investment reduces
the stability of the CVA relative to the GVA it remains the
case that Fc > Fg.
If the change in exogenous expenditures occurs through
a change in autonomous investment, F must be altered to
include the increase in tax credit from both autonomous
investment and induced investment. Ie.
Fc F c
l+C' Trc(l-S) c
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Since Fi was less than F6 in the model where all investment
was autonomous, it must also be less in this case. This is
due to the fact that we get a change tax credit in this model
which we did not get in the previous case.
INVESTMENT AS A FUNCTION OF NET PROFITS
Thus far we have shown that if investment is entirely
exogenous or a function of output, it is not likely that the
value-added tax provides less stability (in our sense) than
the corporate profits tax. As we see below, however, these
results crucially depend upon our assumption that, in the
short-run, the value-added tax is borne by the factors of
production in proportion to their earnings. Before we abandon
this shifting assumption, however, we will first examine the
case where a portion of investment expenditure is determined
by short-run profits as well as by output. That is,
(3.25) I = I(nn, Y) + Ia
where I is exogenous investment.aI
There has been considerable controversy over the form of
(3.25). One school of thought argues that profits are
important in the expectational sense; that is, they reflect
expected rates of return on investment. Another school argues
that profits are important for their cash flow effect; ie.
their effect upon the supply of internal funds. A good
summary of this debate and of the state of knowledge in this
area can be found in a survey article by E. Kuh.1  In the
present case, we will consider the effects of profits upon
investment as a cash flow effect since most of the empirical
effort has been made in this area.
Under the above assumptions about investment, we can
write F for any direct tax system as
(3.26)
where
F=1-C'- [1 - dc d- ]
= dl-
dan
Solving (3.26)
(3.27)
(3.28)
for specific tax systems we find
F = 1 - C -[(1-TE)(1-yS) +
F= 1 - C -(1-T)(1-S)] - a - ny(1-T)
for the profits tax and the GVA, respectively. Hence,
Fg - FT = C -[(TE-Tp)(1-yS)+Tp(1-yS)]+(Tr-T1y
Substituting
(3.30)
T9 = 1, (3.29) becomes
F- F" = C - - (T-SC)y(1-0)
1 E. Kuh, I Theory and Institutions in the Study of
Investment Behavior," American Economic Review, Vol. LIII
(May, 1963), pp. 260-68.
(3.29)
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Since we assume that y > P, (3.30) is strictly negative if
T > SC' . If all retained earnings were invested, ie. - = S,
the latter inequality holds since C/ < 1. In general (3.30)
will be strictly positive if
(3.31) S > 11+ (1 - -- ) 1
We have already concluded that S > (1 - ) 1 hence the
inequality (3.31) depends upon . The larger the marginal
C
propensity to invest out of net profits relitive to the
marginal propensity to consume, the less likely that
Fg > Fn. Now i is the product of two independent terms:
dI dI dSc _
dn dS C dEn dS c
Given our earlier estimates of the parameters of (3.31)
( e = 2, C = .6, P = .15, S = .85), we find that (3.31) holds
as
(3-32) dlc<
dSc
In their recent book, John Meybr and Robert Glauber have
estimated AI/AS at .165 for manufacturing industry as a whole.
lJohn Meyer and Robert Glauber, Investment Decisions,
Economic Forecasting, and Public Policy, (Boston: Division
of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration,
Harvard University, 1964).
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Their study covered the period 1950 - 1958. A complete
specification of the model they employed is given by
(3.33) I = I(Sc, H, MP, r, I-2)
where H is a measure of capacity (our accelerator), MP is the
change in stock market prices--included as a measure of
expectations, and r is the market rate of interest. The fit
of the model was good--an R2 of .93 was obtained.
On the basis of these findings, we might conclude that
the inequality (3.32) is satisfied. Even after allowing for
the statistical errors of estimation there appears to be
good reason for beleiving that the value-added tax provides
greater stability than the profits tax.
We have not yet told the whole story, however. In test-
ing other models of investment, plausible as the above,
Meyer and Glauber found that the coefficient of Sc could
1
range from .13 all the way to .58. Simply by changing the
lag structure of the model or by using alternative measures
of capacity, we might completely reverse our conclusion. The
model (3.33) was simply the one chosen by Meyer and Glauber
as best representing reality. Thus the conclusion drawn above
must be accepted with reservation.
Even more singificant than the above, Meyer and Glauber
1 ibid., p. 143
advanced an alternative hypothesis that investment behavior
is radically different during an expansion than during a
contraction. In the expansionary phase, the primary deter-
minant of investment expenditure is the need to increase
productive capacity. During such periods, either internal
funds are sufficient to meet investment requirements, or if
not, firms will seek external funlds. The primary constraint
on investment is the rate of increase of output. On the down-
side, on the other hand, firms are loathe to use external
sources to finance investment. The primary constraint on
investment in a recession is the internal supply of funds.
Because we shall treat this hypothesis much more fully
in Chapter V, we wonit comment on these arguments at the
present. Instead, we shall simply note that the argument
was strengthened by the fact that the coefficient of Sc
turned out statistically insignificant during expansionary
phases of the business cycle. During the downswings, on the
other hand, the coefficient of Sc was estimated at .40.
Thus it appears that the inequality (3.32) is satisfied
during upswings but violated during recessionary periods.
If we accept this hypothesis of investment, a direct answer
to the question of the relative stability of the value-added-
tax versus the profits tax is not possible. In order to give
an answer we must first know our initial conditions. However,
the case in which we are most interested is the one where
the economy -is at full employment. We are interested in
finding out which tax system would result in the smallest
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deviation from full empolyment. On the basis of Meyer and
Glauber Is argument our answer is that the value-added tax
provides greater stability than the corporate profits tax.
SUMMARY
We began the discussion with the observation that the
corporate profits tax has greater built-in-flexibility than
the value-added tax. That is, for a given change in output,
the profits tax results in a greater change in tax collections
than the value-added tax. In the analysis that followed we
demonstrated that, in spite of having greater built-in-
flexibility, the profits tax created less stability (ie. a
larger impact multiplier) than the value-added tax. The reason
is, of course, that the value-added tax resulted in a smaller
increase in expenditure. It is not enough to compare the built-
in-flexibility of alternative tax structures in order to deter-
mine their relative stability. Instead, the change in
tax receipts which result must be related to changes in
expenditure. The bulk of the value-added tax (that portion
which comes out of wages) affects disposable income directly,
whereas the profits tax affects disposable income only indirect-
ly (through dividends). The retained earnings mechanism
serves as a buffer between the increase in profits tax and
disposable income. Thus a dollarls change in tax under the
profits tax results in much less of a change in disposable
income than would a dollaris increase in tax under the value-
added tax. Therefore, even though a value-added tax
results in -a smaller change in, tax receipts than a
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profits tax, disposable income changes less under the former
than the latter. In what follows, we shall see that this
conclusion depends crucially upon our assumption that the
value-added tax is shifted backwards onto the factors of
production.
VALUE-ADDED TAX UNSHIFTED
In the preceding sections we assumed that when we replace
the corporate profits tax by a value-added tax, the latter
is absorbed by the factors of production in proportion to
their earnings. In other words, businessmen are able to
shift, onto other factors of production, the entire burden
of' the value-added tax, except that portion which falls upon
the return to capital. The result is, of pourse, a large
increase in the rate of corporate profits. Notice that
nothing has been said concerning the shifting behavior of
corporations under the profits tax. However, nothing needs
to be assumed; we can take corporate shifting behavior under
the corporate profits tax as a datum, The analysis of the
preceding sections is consistent with full, partial, or no
shifting of the corporate profits tax.
Whereas the aforementioned pattern of shifting of the
value-added tax is consistent with the classical full employ-
ment model with which we dealt in the first two chapters
(particularly if the profits tax were not shifted), it has
serious deficiencies within the Keynesian income model with
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which we are presently dealing. In the first place, the
prices of the factors of production are not, at least in the
short-run, set according to the marginal productivity principles
of the classical model. Instead, the level of wages, for
example, is determined by such factors as the rate of unemploy-
ment, the rate of change of consumer prices and the level
of profits (or the rate of return on capital). Secondly,
money wages are extremely sticky in the downward direction.
Thus firms could shift the value-added tax only by raising
prices. Given our current political setting, this might prove
quite difficult since firms could not point to a lower level
of profits as their justification for raising prices. (Indeed,
firms have found it difficult to raise prices even when
profits are falling). The average level of profits would
have remained the same because the two taxes are of equal
yield.
Even if firms succeeded in raising goods prices, money
wages might rise sufficiently so as to wipe out any gain in
real profits. First, wages might rise in response to the
higher levels of consumer prices. Furthermore, the higher
level of corporate profits would provide labor unions with
a potent bargaining weapon when making subsequent wage demands.
George Perry has estimated short-run wage changes, using as
independent variables the rate of return on capital, changes
in the consumer price index, and the rate of unemployment.1
1George Perry, 'Aggregate Wage Determination and the
Problem of Inflation," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1961.
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His findings suggest that, in the very short-run, wage increases
would absorb approximately fifty-percent of any increase in
money profits. The derivation of this figure and the estimates
of the model are given in the appendix to this chapter.
Thus, even if firms were able to pass the tax forward
in the forms of higher prices, we would not be justified in
assuming that factors of production bear the tax in propor-
tion to their earnings. A different set oxf shifting assump-
tions appears to be called for in our analysis of the Keynesian
model. The alternative model of shifting that we shall adopt
is that firms bear the entire burden of the value-added tax.
This is equivalent to assuming that, in the short-run, firms
do not distinguish between the corporate profits tax and the
value-added tax. While this may appear to be as unrealistic
as our earlier assumption, there is considerable merit for
this approach.
First, and most important, rigid money wages make it
unlikely that part of the tax could be shifted directly onto
wages in the form of a lower take-home pay. Secondly, it is
also unlikely that firms would try to pass the tax forward
in the form of higher prices; the pressure of public opinion
and hence the threat of government action would present too
much of an obstacle. Thirdly, in the aggregate, firms would
enjoy the same average level of profits under the value-
added tax as under the corporate profits tax; hence there
would be no sense of urgency for shifting the tax. Finally,
this shifting assumption is of the opposite extreme to our
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earlier shifting assumption; combined with our earlier
assumption, this approach enables us to put limits on the
possible outcome of the shift in tax structure.
This shifting assumption is at best a short-run
behavioristic assumption. In the long-run firms will seek
their new optimal positions with respect to the value-added
tax. What we argue, however, is that this new equilibrium
point can be reached only through changes in investment be-
havior and not through short-run pricing behavior.
Our next step will be to reexamine the analysis of the
preceding sections in the light of this new shifting assumption.
CONSUMPTION MODEL
We shall begin with the simple model in which all invest-
ment expenditure is exogenous. Let Fg be the stability
factor of a system where the value-added tax (GVA) is shifted.
Similarly let Fn and F represent the stability factors for
a profits tax and a non-shifted value-added tax, respectively.
From our previous analysis we saw that
Fg = 1 - C E (1-Tg)(1-Sp)]
and FE = 1 - C -[(1-Tp)(1-Sp) + (1-y) ]
Since nn -gy
in the non-shifted value-added tax case, it can be deduced
that
MOT
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(3.34) F = 1 - C -(1-T/)(1-Sy + ST(1-y)]2
Clearly Fg < Fg. That is, the non-shifted value-added tax
provides less stability than the shifted value-added tax.
Furthermore,
(3.35) Fg-Fl = C f[-EUTp)(l-SO, + (l-mI)Tp]2
- C -[(l-ST3)(1-yxS) + SOTP(1-y)
which is less than zero as
(3.36)
Now Z is a function of S, and the latter must fall into the
range 0 < S < 1. Evaluated at S = 1, Z becomes
Z = (0-1) - (0-1) = 0
at S = 0, it becomes
Z = (0-1) - (1-y) < 0
because y. > p. Furthermore,
dZ = (1-)y. 
- (1-y)0 > 0
Z = (1-yLs)(@-1) - (1-y1)(@S-1) < 0
-120-
By the Mean Value Theorem we can deduce that Fn > F6. Q.E.D.
Thus, if the value-added tax is fully absorbed by business,
it will provide less stability than the corporate profits tax.
On the other hand, we have already shown that if the value-
added tax is shifted backwards it will provide greater
stability than the corporate profits tax. The reason for this
turnabout is obvious. When the value-added tax is fully
absorbed by firms, it falls completely upon profits. There-
fore, it must have exactly the same effect upon expenditure
as a profits tax. Recall, however, that the profits tax has
greater built-in-flexibility than the value-added tax. (Tax
receipts change to a larger extent. in response to a change
in output.) Since we are trying to isolate
A4 Ea 04T
AT ~ AT AY
for each tax system, it must be that AE/4Y is smaller under
the profits tax than under the (non-shifted) value-added tax.
In our analysis of the shifted value-added tax, on the other
hand, a dollar s change in taxes had a larger effect upon
expenditure under a value-added tax than under the profits
tax (ie. AE was larger in absolute value). This, of course,
AT
was due to the fact that the bulk of the value-added tax
affected disposable income directly, whereas a good deal of
the profits tax was absorbed by retained earnings.
The above analysis is based upon the assumption that all
-7
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investment expenditure is exogenous. However, we can generalize
these results to the cases where investment is a function of
output and/or profits. Adding these assumptions will only
make the profits tax even more stable than the value-added tax.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have seen, in this chapter, that in a world where all
adjustments are instantaneous (or occur at least within one
quarter), we can make certain statements concerning the
relative stability of the value-added tax as compared with
the corporate profits tax. It is not true, however, that the
response to changes is so immediate. Instead it is true
that the response will be made according to some distributed
lag pattern. The stability implications of a tax structure
are a product of the interactions of the distributed lag
patterns of economic variables. This is the classic indict-
ment of the value of static analysis which is directed to-
wards stability questions. Stability discussions properly
belong within the sphere of dynamic analysis. It has been
shown that the stability of an economic system hinges crucially
upon its lag structure. This is easily seen in the cases of
the cobweb cycle and simple models of business cycles.
Specifically related to the area of automatic stabili-
zation is the work of Phillips.1 Phillips has shown that the
stability implications of certain fiscal structures, such as
1 Phillips, op. cit
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the personal income tax, were crucially dependent upon the lag
structure of the government tax and private spending equations.
He was able to demonstrate that certain automatic stabilizers
may turn out to be destabilizing.
Before any meaningful discussion of automatic stability
can be begun, therefore, a thorough knowledge of the lag
structure of the economy is necessary. The most we can do
with static models is to obtain impact multipliers. Indeed
our F is precisely the impact multiplier of changes in
exogenous expenditure. While impact multipliers are important
they are useful only in determining the level of nextquarter's
income. What happens to income in subsequent periods cannot
be ascertained. We can only guess that a system with a
smaller impact multiplier will also produce more overall
stability.
Thus the conclusions of this chapter must be accepted
with serious reservation. In the chapters that follow we
will attempt to determine the effects of changing tax structures
upon the time paths of several of the components of GNP.
Ideally, this should be done in a general equilibrium context.
However, the sheer magnitude of the task forces us to be
content with a more partial analysis of these components.
In any case, this approach has the merit of studying the
dynamic effects of the tax structure shift, something which is
impossible in our current static framework.
With the aforementioned reservations in mind, what can
we conclude about the relative stability of a profits tax
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and a value-added tax? We have seen that the relative
stability hinges crucially upon how the value-added tax is
shifted. The value-added tax probably cannot be shifted in
the short-run so that its immediate effect will be to reduce
the stability of the economy. In the long-run, however,
firms will tend towards the position dictated by the classical
full employment model. Firms will tend to substitute capital
for labor because, at the current wage-profit ratio, the
existing capital-labor ratio is too low. This will have the
effect of increasing the sensitivity of before-tax profits to
changes in output (ie. i). This in turn will tend to increase
the stability of the economy. To see this, simply consider
the expression for F under the non-shifted value-added tax:
F= 1 - C -[(1-Tg)(1-Sy) + ST (1-y)2
Now
dF9
= C -[ - (1-T)S -STy] > 0
Thus in the long-run the system will be more stable than in
the short-run. Whether or not this force can be so strong
as to eventually make the value-added tax more stable than
the profits tax cannot be known. It is, however, a possibility.
If it does, we might safely argue that the non-shifting model
has greater applicability in the short-run whereas, the
shifted model has greater validity in the long-run.
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APPENDIX
The equation used by Perry 1 to estimate the quarterly rate
of increase in wages is given by:
(A.1) AW = -4.313 + .367C 1 + 14.711 U_ +
(.054) (2.188)
.424R_1 + .796 AR + e
(.068) (.176)
R = .870
where w is the wage rate, C is the change in the cost of
living index, U is the unempolyment rate, R is the rate of
return on capital, and 4indicates quarterly changes. Assum-
ing the capital stock is held fixed we can rewrite (A.1) as
(A.2) 4w = -4.313w + .367C-iw + 14.711 U 1 w +
.424 n_ w + .796 An w
-l K K
where n is the level of profits. Given initial conditions
(A.2) yields the time path of the wage rate. When we impose
the value-added tax and allow prices and profits to rise the
initial conditions are changed and (A.2) will give rise to
a new time path of the wage rate. What we seek is to isolate
1Perry, op. cit
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the difference between these time paths. If we denote the
change in wage rate under our original initial conditions
by Aw and let Aw represent the change in wage rate under
a value-added tax, then we want to determine Aw - Aw.
Assuming that the unemployment rate remains unchanged and
that C-1= 0 and An = 0 under our original system, we have
(A-3) w - w = .796 A'
as the difference in the time path of wages for the first
quarter. We can ignore the lagged variables in this calcu-
lation since they are as yet unaffected.
The difference in the wage bill for the first quarter is
easily calculated as
(A.4) Awages =(IW - Aw)L = .796 Alt wL
It has been determined empirically that
(A.5) wL 3
Hence we can rewrite (A.4) as
(A.6) Awages = .796 A n3R
= 2.44R Ai7
Assuming that R = 10, (A.6) becomes
-~
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(A.7) Awages = .24 An
along with equation (A.7) we must also employ the following
accounting indentity
(A.8) A n = (An) - Awages
where (An) is that increase in profits which would have
resulted had there been no wage increase. Equation (A.7)
and (A.8) together yield
(A.9) 4wages .2(A n)
That is, approximately one-fifth of the potential increase in
profits would occur to wages in the first quarter.
In the second quarter, the price rise (which we assume
to be TO) comes into play. If we solve equation (A.2) for
the second quarter, we find
(A.10) Awages+1 = .26(An)
That is by the second quarter, wage increases have absorbed
approximately 46 Z'of the increase in profits which would have
resulted from the price rise ( Awages + Awages+1). To see
we simply rewrite equation (A.2) as
. wages+1 = .367CwL + .424[i - 3] wIJ + .796 A++1+ .79 +1
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Assuming the price rise to be equal to 101(T = 100l4 and
making use of identities previously employed, this collapses
to
(A.l) Awages+ .ll + .10(An) - .24n + .24n+
+1 +1
Now
(A.12) E+1 =n - Awages+1
thus
(A.13) A wages+1 = .11 + .09(Ait)
We assume that profits would have doubled had there been no
wage increase; hence
2it = 2(Ait)
and
#
= t - .2(An) = 1.8(An)
thus from (A.13)
4wages+1 = .26(4 n) Q. E. D.
In subsequent quarters the 4 term and the n_1 term
cancel each other out so that this iteration need not go on any
further. The 466figure is a slight underestimate since
Perry' s equation applies to before tax wages. Thus a value-
added tax of 101%would have to be added giving us a total of
approximately 507,.
CHAPTER IV
THE VALUE-ADDED TAX AND INVESTOR'S RISK
VALUE-ADDED TAX - SHIFTED
One of the more probable effects of shifting from a profits
tax to a value-added tax is an increase in the variance of
the rate of return on capital over the business cycle.
The corporate profits tax, with its high marginal rate,
serves as a substantial buffer between the gross and net
profits of business. The value-added tax, contrarily, be-
cause its tax base is more stable than that of the profits
tax and because its marginal rate is relatively low, provides
must less of a cushion for net profits.
How does variance in the rate of return affect the level
of investment? It can be argued that among the variables
that affect investment decisions are included the expected
rate of return on the project and some objective measure of
the riskiness of the project. The expected variance in the
rate of return can be regarded as one possible objective
measure of the risk of an investment. Thus our investment
function might be written as
(4.1) = I(r,oar' ~ ~ ~ ~)
where r and o r are the first and second moments of the rate
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of return on investment.
Because it is unlikely that businessmen can successfully
predict o2r for any given project, it can be argued that
businessmen use as an approximation, the variability of the
rate of return which they have experienced in the past. Thus,
if by changing tax structure we increase the variability of
the rate of return on existing assets, businessmen will
likely scale upwards the level of risk associated with a
new investment project. If all other things remain equal
this should decrease the level of aggregate investment
expenditure.
Before we can estimate the change in the variance of the
rate of return caused by the shift in tax structure, we
must first decide how likely it is that other things will
remain equal. This question is deeply embedded in the
question of the short-run shifting of the value-added tax.
If we employ our assumptions of the first two chapters, taxes
are not shifted in the short-run because factor supplies are
inelastic. In this case the corporate profits tax is com-
pletely borne by business and the value-added tax is borne
proportionately ( according to factor rewards) by the factors
of production. Gross factor rewards are determined by the
capital-labor ratio and the latter is fixed in the short-run.
Under these assumptions, the net rate of return can be
written
(4.2) rn = p)r
p
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(4.j3) rn = (1-v)r
V
for the profits tax and value-added tax, respectively. For
simplicity s sake we will assume that the value-added tax
is restricted to the corporate sector so that
trv =TP 0 i
I= gross corporate profits
Y = net corporate product
From (4.2) and (4.3) we can calculate the variances of
the net rate of return under both tax systems
(4.4) V(rn) = (1-TP)2 V(r)
p
(4.5) V(rn) = (1-v)2 V(r)
v
Because we assume that r is the same for both tax systems,
in the short-run, it is obvious that V(r ) < V(rn). (Recall
that Tv ;1 and T:= .5).
However, it is also obvious that the expected rate of
return on investment, r, is higher under the value-added
tax than under the profits tax. As a matter of fact,
-n
rv (1Tv) :
r"n (1-t9) 5
p
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That is, the expected rate of return under the value-added
tax should be nearly double that under the corporate profits
tax.
Thus, under the above set of shifting assumptions, all
other things have not remained equal. The net result of
shifting from a profits tax to a value-added tax is to
increase both the variance and the mean of the rate of
return. Unless we know what the tradeoff is between risk
(variance) and the yield (mean), we cannot say what will be
the effect upon the level of investment of shifting tax
structure.
VALUE-ADDED TAX NOT SHIFTED
It was argued, in the previous chapter, that in the short-
run businessmen will not be able to shift the value-added
tax when the latter is substituted for a profits tcx. In
other words, in the short-run, businessmen are forced to
1Suppose yield and risk enter our investment function in
the following way:
I(r,o) = I(r) = (x).
r 0 2
or
That is, the tradeoff between yield and risk is proportional.
In such a case it is clear that investment will be higher under
the profits tax than under the value-added tax.
2
Proof: x = x = r ' x-=
(1 1 )V(r)9 x (1-,v)V(r) x
(1-C) < 1.
(1- v)
Generally, however, it is assumed that people are risk-averters.
That is,for a given percentage increase in risk people demand an
even greater percentage increase in yield.If this is the'case,then
investment will be lower under the value-added tax than under
the profits tax.
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treat all taxes as costs--ie. to be deducted from profits.
This would imply that two taxes of equal yield result in an
equal average level of profits. It follows, therefore that
if we substitute a value-added tax for a profits tax, we
can write
(4.6) r = r - TvY
(4.7) rn = r - T r
p
where we assume that r is the same under both tax regimes,
Y is value-added by corporations, and K is the value of the
capital stock. It should be clear that because the taxes
-n 
-n
are of equal.yield rv = r . We should explain what is meant
by equivalent tax yield. If we were to insist on equal tax
yields for any given quarter or any given year, it would be
the case that the time path of the rate of return under both
tax systems would be identical. Thus there could be no
difference in the variance of the rate of return between
the two tax systems. Clearly, this is a meaningless defini-
tion because it would be impossible to implement. Instead,
we define equivalent yields as equal tax yield over the course
of a business cycle. Defined in this way, the tax systems
result in a different time path of rn even though rn remains
the same for both tax systems.
If we adopt the above approach, all that remains to be
done is a calculation of the resulting variances of rn
under both tax regimes. If we find (as we will) that the
variance of r is greater than that for r we can conclude
v p
that investment will be lower under the value-added tax than
under the profits tax.
A. Measures of Variance_
The following procedure was followed to estimate the
difference in the variance of rn which would result by
replacing a value-added tax for a corporate profits tax.
For the period 1947 to 1962 the following data were obtained
from the Survey of Current Business:1  (1) net profits of
corporation before tax and before inventory valuation adjust-
ment; (2) value-added by corporate business. The period
(1947 - 1962) was broken up into five sub-periods correspond-
ing to the post-war business cycles. They are given as
follows: 1947 - 1 to 1949 - 4;:1950 - 1 to 1954 - 3; 1954 - 4
to 1958 - 1; 1958 - 2 to 1961 - 1; 1961 - 2 to 1962 - 2.
For these sub-periods the following variances and covariances
were calculated: V(n), V(Y), and Cov(n,Y). n is used as a
proxy for r because a good capital stock series was unavail-
able. This shouldn't make too much difference since the
qapital stock will not change significantly within a business
cycle subperiod.
With the above information we can calculate the variance
U. S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business (July 1949-63), tables 7, 56.
.....ikh m . ..
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in net profits under the corporate income tax.
(4.8) V(,n) = (lTP)2V()
p
Similarly, for the value-added tax we have
(4.9) V(n) = V(t) + T 2vV(Y) - 2TVCov(Y,n)
Taking the ratio of (4.9) to (4.8) we have
(4.10) V =(-1 )2+ ( v2 21 Cov(Y)(n _p V i (I p)2  V(n)
p
All that remains to be calculated is 'v and rP. We assume
TP to be .5. Actually it was much lower than this early
in the period and much higher than .5 during the Korean
War, when excess profits taxes were in effect. The pitfalls
of this assumption will be discussed in the next section.
The rate of value-added tax, -v was calculated as followc;
* cy =Ir .p x i = (1947,48 - - -,62)
That is, tax yields were equated over the entire period and
not merely over any single business cycle. This is perhaps
the most realistic constraint on T since it is unlikely
that the tax rate could be manipulated frequently. The
values of the ratio (4.10) for each of the subperiods is
listed in column one of Table (3).
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Table 3.
RATIO OF V(n) to V(nn)
v p
eriod IVA GVA
1947-1--49-4 3.60 3.75
1950-1--54-3 4.41 4.59
1954-4--58-1 3.45 3.61
1958-2--61-1 2.60 2.70
1961-2--62-2 2.45 2.43
Weighted Average 3.53 3.86
As can be ovserved, the ratios clearly indicate that the
value-added tax would result in much more volatility in after-
tax profits than does the profits tax. If we take a weighted
average of these subperiod ratios, using the number of
quarters in a subperiod as the weighting factor, we obtain
a ratio of 3.53. The variance in net profits would be on
the average nearly 3 1/2 times as large under the value-
added tax than under the profits tax. There is, however,
substantial variation among the subperiod ratios. Because
of the Korean War, period (2) should be eyed with suspicion.
Various abnormal constraints were in operation during much
of this period. This is evidenced by the lack of correlation
between value-added and before-tax profits in this period.
Hence period (2) is likely an overestimate,
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Furthermore, period (5) has only five observations--all
of them during an expansionary phase. This probably leads
to an underestimate of the relative variances. In any case,
the variation in after-tax profits, under the profits tax,
appears to be about one-third of that under the value-added
tax.
The model of the value-added tax, tested above, was that
of an IVA since depreciation is excluded from the tax base.
Under a GVA (depreciation included), the following expression
holds for after-tax profits.
(4.11) nD = - r Y-- D
v
where D stands for depreciation. Now,
V(n) 2 2
(4.12) v = - 1 +
V(,n) (1TP)2 (__rp)2 _ p) P)2 V 7t)
p
2___ -Coy 2 t2
Cov(D )-Cov(nY)+ -- v Cov(D,Y)
(1-P )2 V () lp)1 V)2)
The results of the calculation (4.12) appear in column (2)
of Table (3). It appears that the GVA provides slightly
more variability to after-tax profits than does the IVA.
Table (3) reveals that the weighted average is 3.86 under
the GVA as compared with 3.53 for the IVA. This result is
to be expected because, by adding depreciation, we add an
element to the tax base which shows little cyclical variability.
UOn the basis of the above analysis, there is reason to
believe that investment would be lower, on the average,
under a value-added tax than under a profits tax. Note,
however, that this conclusion hinges critically upon the
assumption that businessmen are forced to completely absorb
the value-added tax in the short-run. As we have pointed
out earlier, if the value-added tax is borne by the factors
of production, no such conclusion can be reached without
further information as to how businessmen regard risk.
B. Some Reservations
There were two major simplifying assumptions made in
the above analysis: (1) it was assumed that the basic
variables of the model, (n, Y, and D) were invariant to the
tax system in existence; (2) that these variables would
assume the same values if total tax collections by govern-
ment differed from those actually realized. We will deal
with these matters separately.
If a change in tax structure does affect the level of
investment, as we have hypothesized, then our assumption of
the invariance of n, Y, and D is wholly unwarranted. In so
doing, we are dealing with a general equilibrium system with
partial equilibrium methods. For example, simple income
analysis tells us that if we change the level of investment
we change the level of income (value-added) and more directly,
we change the level of depreciation. The latter can be
ignored because investment is only a small proportion of the
existing capital stock. Furthermore the change in invest-
ment brought about by the change in tax structure is only
a fraction of investment.
We cannot treat so lightly the resulting change in value-
added, however. Because profits are a function of value-
added, a change in tax structure which affects investment
will also affect profits. But this change in profits will
result in a further change in investment, and so on until
a new equilibrium (if there is one) is reached. Therefore,
if we believe that the substitution of a value-added tax
will lower investment, our analysis would tend to under-
estimate the change that would actually occur.
Given this criticism of our approach, there remains
considerable justification for the method we employed. First,
we are interested in isolating the behavior of net profits,
under different tax structures, over a typical business
cycle and are not concerned with the level of investment as
such. Instead, all that we have to assume is that the basic
relationship between profits and value-added is unaffected
by the tax structure. Given this assumption and goal our
analysis retains some validity. For what we are doing, is
merely comparing the effects of two tax regimes upon the
variance of net profits over a typical business cycle.
Whether or not a cycle of the same amplitude and periodicity
would occur under the two tax systems during the period under
discussion is wholly irrelevant and cannot be determined by
our analysis. Our goal is to merely compare the variance
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in net profits over a given business cycle.
The second problem with which we have to deal is less
troublesome than the first and has been partially resolved
by the discussion above. The problem is that the corporate
profits tax was not at uniform level throughout the period
analyzed. Instead, it started out at about 3047bin the late
forties, went to approximately 60'h during the Korean War
and then settled down to 52% in the post-Korean War period.
This is not a major problem, however. As we have mentioned
above, we are merely trying to determine the effect of a 50o
corporate income tax over a given business cycle. Such a
procedure is no more illegitimate than assuming that a
value-added tax was in effect during the period. Thus our
conclusions of this chapter must be amended to read:, If
there would be no difference in the pattern of business
cycle behavior under the two tax regimes, there is reason
to believe that there would be a lower level of investment
under the value-added tax because of increased variability
in net profits.
CHAPTER V
THE VALUE-ADDED TAX, RETAINED EARNINGS, AND INVESTMENT
In the preceding chapter we concluded that the substi-
tution of a value-added tax for a corporate profits tax would
result in a net increase in the variance of the rate of return
over the business cycle. We could not, however, determine
or even put limits on the change in investment which would
result. To do this it would be necessary to determine which
shifting pattern would be followed by business. Even if we
were able to determine the latter we do not have quantitative
estimates of key parameters. Hence we can make only qualita-
tive statements about the effects of the alternative tax
structures on investment.
There is, however, another avenue through which invest-
ment can be affected by a change in tax structure. And this
effect is much less subtle than in the preceding case.
Investment, particularly in the short-run, is often postu-
lated to be a function of the supply of internal funds. As
we have already demonstrated, the tax SUbstitution affects
both the level and the pattern of short-run profits--and
hence internal funds--over the business cycle. Unlike the
case of increased variance in the rate of return, there is
an abundance of empirical work in this area. Using these
empirical findings, we can estimate the effects of the change
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in tax structure upon investment spending.
Before we can proceed we must make clear our shifting
assumptions. As before, we will treat two separate cases.
The first is that businessmen will not distinguish between
the taxes as long as they are of equivalent yield. This,
of course, is the case where the value-added tax is paid
entirely from profits. The second case is that with which
we have dealt throughout this paper. That is, because
factor supplies are inelastic in the short-run, no shifting
is possible, and the value-added tax is borne by each factor
in proportion to its reward.
The model of investment and its estimation which we
shall employ in this chapter is the "residual-funds accelerator
hypothesis of John Meyer and Robert Glauber. Their main
arguments can be summarized as follows. Most short-run
models of investment are based upon either simple accelerator
or capacity-output relationships on one hand or simply cash
flow models of investment on the other. Meyer and Glauber
reject these simple relationships in favor of an eclectic
view.
A discontinuity in investment behavior occurs at the
point where full utilization of productive capacity is
achieved. An accelerator or capacity-output relationship
is suggested as the key factor in establishing short-run
1Meyer and Glauber, op. cit
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investment budgets when capacity is fully utilized and
contrarily, the level of cash funds flowing into the firm
from current operations is considered a prime determinant
when capacity is less fully utilized.
There exists an optimal capital-output ratio, for a
given technology, which results in lowest unit costs. During
a business upswing investment demands stem primarily from the
desire to maintain this optimal capital-output ratio. If the
supply of internal funds is not sufficient to meet these
investment demands firms will seek external sources of funds.
In the downswing, on the other hand, firms will invest primarily
in cost-saving devices and in increased capacity to meet sub-
sequent boom demands. However, firms are loathe to employ
external financing in such periods, and thus will only invest
up to the available supply of internal funds.
Thus this model of investment behavior is non-linear.
There must be a different investment equation for periods
of upswing than for periods of downswing. This suggests
that, not only is the total amount of internal funds over
and given period of significance for investment, but the
timing of the flow of internal funds is also of importance.
A dollar increase of internal funds is much more potent
for raising investment during a downswing than during an
upswing.
The estimates for this bifurcated model of investment
are as follows:
i = 490.7 + .409F t- 433.3rt + .877 It-2
(.126) (199.3) (.217)
+ seasonal corrections + et Ra = .900
Upswings:
i = 747.7 + 2 563-3Ht-l+ 1 9
.2MPt-V 935.Ort-3
(700.6) (3.4) (274.1)
+ . 8 6 8 It-2+ seasonal corrections + R2  .977
(.094)
where
H = capacity measure
MP = stock market prices
r = market rate of'interest
F = internal funds = net profits + depreciation
- dividents
It should be noted that this model has been estimated
for the manufacturing sector only and was restricted to the
period 1949-3--1958-4. Furthermore, the non-linearity of
the model was attested to by the fact that the coefficient
of internal funds was statistically insignificant in the
upswing model.
VALUE-ADDED TAX -- NOT SHIFTED
The first test that we shall perform will be based upon
the assumption that the value-added tax is not shifted.
This implies that the basic variables of the model will
remain unchanged as we change from a profits tax to a
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value-added tax. For example, output and prices will re-
main unchanged and the expression for net profits at any
time t is given by
7E n = TE - Tp7E
p
TE n - T Y
for the profits tax and the value-added tax, respectively.
We again make the assumption that a 500profits tax existed
throughout the period (see p. 139.).
Under the above assumptions, we can calculate the time
series of internal funds that would have arisen had there
been a 50%corporate profits tax or a equal yield value-
added tax in effect throughout the period. These figures
are shown in Table (4).
TABLE 4.
SUPPLY OF INTERNAL FUNDS FOR
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS (billions of dollars)
PROFITS TAX VA TAX
L947-1 2.19 2.74
2 1.98 2.34
3 1.96 2.22
4 1.54 1.71
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TABLE 4. (cont d)
PROFITS TAX VA TAX
1948-1 2.34 2.73
2 2.25 2.54
3 2.29 2.53
4 1.75 1.96
1949-1 2.05 2.04
2 1.67 1.35
3 2.01 1.89
4 1.07 .88
l950-1 2.06 2.06
2 2.67 2.03
3 3.25 4.10
4 2.86 4.15
L951-1 3.79 4.64
2 3.62 4.25
3 3.15 3.39
4 2.71 2.83
L952-1 3.08 3.12
2 2.96 2.78
3 2.91 2.63
4 2.74 2.31
953-1 3.63 3.62
2 3.90 4.00
3 3.49 3.41
4 2.36 1.23
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TABLE 4. (cont d)
PROFITS TAX VA TAX
1954-1 2.87 2.41
2 3.24 2.91
3 2.44 2.42
4 1.96 1,82
1955-1 3.76 3.83
2 4.47 4.77
3 3.93 4.12
4 3.53 3.85
1956-1 4.19 4.44
2 4.34 4.62
3 3.84 3.64
4 3.76 3.66
1957-1 4.22 4.38
2 4.29 4.22
3 4.00 3.59
4 3.29 2.51
1958-1 2.77 1.79
2 3.18 2.21
3 3.70 3.05
4 4.02 3.69
1959-1 4.54 4.02
2 5.26 5.61
3 4.07 3.54
4 3.66 3.99
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TABLE 4. (cont d)
Source: SEC - FTC Quarterly Report on Manufacturing
Note: Column totals may not add due to rounding.
From these time series it can be observed that internal
funds are generally larger under a value-added tax during
expansion and larger during recessions under the profits tax.
Indeed, if one use GNP as a measure of upswings (47-1--48-4,
50-2--53-3, 55-1--57-2, 58-4--59-4) and recessions, one
finds that the value-added tax generates six billion dollars
less internal funds during recessions than does the profits
tax. If we use some other measure of upswings and down-
swings, specifically one related to capacity utilization
(as did Meyer and Glauber), this difference is greatly
expanded.
This effect upon the supply of internal funds should
be expected because it has already been demonstrated that
the variance in net profits is much larger under a value-
added than under a profits tax.
Our next step is simply to simulate the model estimated
by Meyer and Glauber using the new time series on internal
funds. The results of this simulation are shown in columns
one and two of Table (5).
TABLE 5.
MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT UNDER THE
PROFITS TAX AND VA TAX (millions 1954 dollars)
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TABLE 5. (cont d)
PROFITS TAX VA TAX VA TAX (Shifted)
1949-3 1996 1845 2545
4 2063 2010 2686
1950-1 1190 971 2266
2 1928 1881 2469
3 1732 1542 2668
4 2670 2629 3141
1951-1 2021 1860 2839
2 2784 2750 3194
3 2556 2418 3269
4 3265 3236 3622
1952-1 2400 2280 3020
2 2997 2972 3307
3 2547 2442 3086
4 3260 3240 3531
1953-1 2509 2417 2978
2 3079 3060 3314
3 2737 2557 3145
4 3250 3235 3455
1954-1 2023 1400 2979
2 2701 2500 3597
3 2275 1597 3881
4 2588 2362 3886
1955-1 1651 1004 3634
2 2547 2351 3676
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TABLE 5. (cont d)
Comparing columns one and two it can be observed that,
for the period considered, the value-added tax would yield
roughly l1"oless investment than would the profits tax.
However, this ll7refers only to manufacturing investment.
Because investment by manufacturing corporation comprises
only about one-half of total nrivate investment our figure
must be reduced to approximately 5 1/21. It is likely that
two other major components of private investment, residential
PROFITS TAX VA TAX VA TAX (Shifted)
1955-3 2220 1658 3945
4 3128 2992 4144
1956-1 2174 1776 4675
2 3042 3018 4876
3 2705 2466 5872
4 3179 3122 5657
1957-1 2472 2227 6170
2 2890 2894 6000
3 2635 2397 6747
4 2837 2373 6354
1958-1 1968 1482 6269
2 1784 1037 5418
3 1676 913 6008
4 1953 918 5639
Totals 93432 83832 153964
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construction of owner-occupied housing and investment by
public utilities, would be unaffected by the change of tax
structure. In the case of owner-occupied housing this is
because neither tax affects the stream of returns of the
investment. As for public utilities, the return earned on
capital is so regulated that it would remain constant under
either tax regime. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether
public utilities rely significantly on internal finance,
since they have easy access to the capital markets.
This leaves us with the final major component of private
fixed investment--construction of residential rental property
and commerical rental property. Though the manufacturing
sector may finance a portion of this investment expenditure
through retained earnings, the bulk of such investment is
financed through financial institutions particularly-banks
and insurance companies. It is doubtful, therefore, that
we can safely apply the same structural equations to this
form of investment as we used for manufacturing investment.
For lack of a better alternative, we shall have to omit this
component of investment from our discussion.
There is another qualification which must be made to
the above estimates. Recall that lagged investment appears
in our explanatory equations. Because of this feature,
our results may be biased. This is due to the fact that
the lagged investment variable makes our results quite
sensitive to the timing of the tax substitution. If we make
the substitution during a downswing, there will be a much
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greater culmulative effect upon investment than if the
substitution were made during an upswing. Recall that a
value-added tax gives rise to a much smaller flow of internal
funds during a recession than does a profits tax. Furthermore,
the internal funds variable enters the model during a down-
swing. Since the estimation period begins during a downswing,
we have exagerated the effect on investment of the change in
tax structure.
To get an estimate of the bias created by beginning the
simulation during a downswing we need only simulate the model
again--except this time we should begin the simulation during
an upswing. The difference between the two outcomes is a
measure of the bias. The results of this simulation are
shown in Table (6).
TABLE 6.
MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT (1950-2)-(1958-1) (in millions 1954)
PROFITS TAX VA TAX
1950-2
3 1899 1899
4 2688 2688
1951-1 2170 2170
2 2800 2800
3 2688 2688
4 3279 3279
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TABLE 6. (cont d)
PROFITS TAX VA TAX
1952-1 2515 2515
2 3009 3009
3 2647 2647
4 3272 3272
1953-1 2596 2596
2 3089 3089
3 2813 2813
4 3260 3260
1954-1 2146 2146
2 2709 2520
3 2382 2194
4 2552 2379
1955-1 17 1523
2 2463 2341
3 2302 2110
4 3090 2984
1956-1 2328 2161
2 3009 3011
3 2839 2800
4 3189 3116
1957-1 2588 2517
2 2899 2888
3 2736 2649
4 2861 2692
TABLE 6. (cont d)
PROFITS TAX VA TAX
1958-1 2057 1702
2 1806 1460
3 1754 1104
4 1812 1285
Total 87991 84307
Whereas the difference in investment between the two
tax regimes was originally 9.6 billion, it is now only 3.7
billion. The mere fact that we began our simulation during
a downswing, then, was responsible for 5.9 billion or 6270
of the total decrease in investment which results when we
shift from a profits tax to value-added tax. As a percentage
of culmulative investment, however, this factor will tend
to zero as we take a long enough period. Thus, instead of
an 1116decrease in manufacturing investment we should expect
only a 4 1/2 %(3.7/88.0) decrease when we shift from a profits
tax to a value-added tax.
VALUE-ADDED TAX NOT SHIFTED
We will now consider the case where the value-added tax
is borne proportionately by the factors of production accord-
ing to factor payments. In this case we can write profits as:
nJ n vn
v
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lTn = - p7t
p
for the value-added tax and profits tax, respectively. It
should be clear that, in this model, the flow of internal
funds will be larger under the value-added tax than under
the profits tax at any point in time. Consequently, invest-
ment will also be higher under the value-added tax at any
point in time. All we have to do is calculate by how much
investment would be increased. The results of this calcula-
tion are shown in column (3) of Table (5).
It can quickly be seen, comparing columns (1) and (3),
that there will be huge increases in investment under the
value-added tax. Towards the end of the period, investment
is nearly three times as high under the value-added tax than
for the profits tax. For the period as a whole, investment
has increased by 657.
The above calculations must be amended somewhat to take
into account the fact that dividends will have increased in
the face of higher profit levels. Firms will gradually
increase their rate of divident payments until their "target '
payout ratio has been reached. What this "target ratio is,
has been open to some dispute. However, Brittain has made a
convincing argument that dividends are not based upon net
profits but upon cash flow ( see p. 100). Using this model,
1Brittain, op. cit., p. 275
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he has estimated the target payout ratio to be in the neighbor-
hood of 306. Thus, approximately one-third of the increase
in net profits which result from the substitution of the
value-added tax for the corporate profits tax will be distri-
buted in the form of dividends. It should be clear, however,
that there may be a substantial lag before dividends are
fully adjusted to the higher level of profits. Even after
allowing for increased dividends we must conclude that there
will be larger increases in investment if we substitute a
value-added tax for a profits tax.
CONCLUSION
We have observed, once again, that the effect of sub-
stituting a value-added tax for a corporate profits tax upon
the rate of investment depends completely upon how the value-
added tax is shifted. If, on one hand, businessmen are able
to shift the value-added backwards onto the factors of produc-
tion, the resulting higher level of profits will lead to
large increases in investment. On the other hand, if firms
completely absorb the value-added tax, there will be C reduc-
tion in investment because the value-added tax reduces the
supply of internal funds during periods of recession.
In the short-run, it appears that the latter shifting
assumption is more realistic. The reasons have been advanced
before and need not be repeated here (see p. 115). Thus, the
immediate effect of shifting form a profits tax to a value-
added tax will be a reduction in investment.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We began this study with an inquiry into the nature of
value-added taxation and its relationship to other well-
known forms of taxation. This analysis was conducted within
the context of a classical full employment model so that
we could isolate the "optimal equilibrium solutions of the
economic variables under any given tax structure at a given
point of time. That is, the assumptions of the classical
model enable us to isolate the target values of economic
variables which the economy is continually striving to achieve.
Our conclusions hinge crucially upon our assumptions
concerning the supply of labor and the interest-elasticity
of savings. The analysis of the first chapter was based
upon the assumption that the supply of labor is inelastic
with respect to the real wage. In most situations, however,
it is easy to extend the analysis to the case where the labor
force is a function of the real wage. With these reservations
in mind we can summarize our findings.
There are three variants of the value-added tax which
are of interest. These variants differ only with respect to
their treatment of depreciation allowances. We can have a
system of value-added taxation which permits no depreciation
allowance (GVA), one which allows economic depreciation to
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be deducted from the tax base (IVA), or one which allows
depreciation to be taken instantaneously (CVA). Unless both
labor supply and savings are inelastic with respect to their
respective rewards, each of these variants will yield a
different pattern of goods and services at a given point of
time and over time; otherwise, they will have identical out-
put effects. Specifically, if labor supply is inelastic and
saving is positively related to the rate of interest, the
CVA will yield a higher rate of capital accumulation than will
the IVA, and the latter will result in more investment than
the GVA. The reason is straightforward--the greater the
depreciation allowance (in present value terms), the higher
the rate of return on investment and consequently the
greater the rate of interest paid to savers.
On the other hand, if labor supply is also an increasing
function of its reward, we cannot, by a priori reasoning,
determine the relative effect upon investment of our different
versions of the value-added tax. This is because those
variants which yield the highest rate of return to saving
also yield the smallest labor force. Because the level
of saving is an increasing function of both the rate of
interest and the level of disposable income, and because
the latter is, in turn, positively related to the size
of the labor force, we cannot tell without a knowledge of
the parameters of the system, what will be the effect
upon investment of changing from one variant of the value-
added tax to another.
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Furthermore, if saving is interest inelastic and labor
supply is a positive function of the real wage, the relative
effect upon investment of each of the variants is obvious.
Investment will be highest under the GVA and lowest under the
CVA. Similarly, we can calculate the investment effects for
other combinations of assumptions about labor supply and saving.
Comparing the value-added tax with other well-known forms
of taxation, we find that the value-added tax, except in its
CVA formulation, is not a new concept of taxation. We have
shown that the GVA is equivalent to a sales tax upon the final
output of the economy (GNP). This equivalence holds for any
set of assumptions about labor force and saving elasticities.
Furthermore, the IVA is basically equivalent to a flat-rate-
no exemption-income tax. The sole difference between these taxes
is that the latter prcvides a loss offset against bankruptcy
while the former does not.
The CVAhowever, is not, as has been frequently asserted,
equivalent to a flat rate consumption tax. The reason is
because the CVA affects only that portion of disposable
income which is spent on consumer goods, whereas the consumption
tax affects all of disposable income--however it is spent. The
net result of shifting from'a value-added,tax (CVA) to a
consumption tax, therefore, is an increase in the rate of capital
accumulation. Moreover, if the supply of labor is inelastic,
the CVA is the only form of direct tax (other than a lump-sum
tax) which is completely *neutral" (in the allocative sense)
within a period of time and over time. The GVA and the IVA,
on the other hand, distort the choice between future and present
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consumption. If the labor supply is a function of the real wage
this is no longer true. The CVA, as well as the GVA and IVA,
affects the real wage; thus the CVA distorts the choice between
work and leisure.
In the second chapter we turned our attention to the incidence
effects of the value-added tax. Our primary objective was to
determine the effect upon the real distribution of income of a
shift in tax structure from a profits tax to a value-added tax.
This particular comparison was made because it is often proposed
that we replace the corporation profits tax, at least in part,
by a value-added tax. As in the first chapter, the classical
full employment model was employed along with the assumption
of an inelastically supplied labor force.
The conclusion of this chapter can be summarized as follows.
In the short run, it is likely that the after-tax real wage
will fall and after-tax profits will rise. This result is to
be expected because we shift from a tax which bears solely on
profits to one under which wages and profits are taxed equally.
There is a case, however, where this movement in after-tax wages
is reversed. If the capital-good industry is subtantially less
capital intensive than the consumer-good industry and if the
saving rate is highly sensitive to the rate of interest (in a
positive manner), then both after-tax realprofits and after-tax
real wages may rise in the face of a shift from a profits tax to
a value-added tax. However, neither of thses conditions seem to
characterize the United States economy.
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Among the variants of the value-added tax, the CVA results
in the lowest after-tax real wage and the GVA in the hig.hest.
An opposite conclusion was reached with respect to after-tax
real profits. Assuming that profits are concentrated in the
hands of a few and that wages are relatively equally distributed,
then, in the short run, the distribution of real income is more
unequal under a value-added tax than under a profits tax.
Furthermore, the GVA will yield less income inequality than
the IVA, and the latter will result in less inequality than the
CVA.
We can generalize these results to the long run as well.
If the saving rate is positively related to the rate of interest,
however, factor rewards under the alternative tax structures
will differ less in the long run than in the short run. Those
tax systems which yield the highest after-tax profits and the lowet
after-tax wages in the short run also give rise to the fastest
rate of capital accumulation. A larger capital stock in the
future implies hig;her wages and lower profits. This effect
cannot go so far as to reverse the short-run incidence effects
however, whithout increases in the rate of saving which are
wholly unrealistic. Ne can conclude, therefore, that the
subtitution of a value-added tax for a rrofits tax will increase
income inequality in both the short and the long run.
In the next three chapters our attention was devated to an
examination of the short-run effects of substituting a value-
added tax for a corporate profits tax. Specifically, we analyzed
the implications for the short-run stability of the economy.
In addition, we examined the short-run effect of the tax
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substitution upon the pattern and the level of investment
expenditure. To perform these tasks properly, we had to
abandon the assumption of the classical full employment model.
Instead, we aassumed that the economy is not always at full
employment and that the profit maximizing conditions are not
always satisfied. That this change in assumptiorB is necessary
to analyze the short-run stability of the economy is obvious.
Moreover, because the primary constraint on investment in the
classical world is the rate of saving) the classical model is
wholly inaadequate for a study of the short-run effects of the
tax change upon investment. A Keynesian unemployment model is
more suitable for this purpose since investment is no longer
constrained by the level of saving (except in the definitional
ex-post sense).
Our conclusions regarding the sort-run stability of the
economy hinge critically upon the way that the value-added tax
is shifted. If the value-added tax is borne completely by
profits.the short-run stability of the economy will be reduced
as a result of the shift from a corporate income tax to a value-
added tax. On the other hand, if the value-added tax is borne
by each factor of production in proportion to his earnings, the
stability of the economy is increased. There is reason to
bilieve that, at least in the first instance, the first shifting
assumption is more plausible. In the long run, however, business-
men will move towards the profit-maximizing points on their
production functions, thus increasing the stability of the economy.
-162-
This force may go so far as to bring about the results of our
second shifting assumption.
At this point it should be mentioned that we have utilized
a very restrictive definition of short-run stability. When we
speak of greater stability we simply mean a smaller impact multi-
plier. Ideally we would like to say something about the overall
stabilizing power of our two tax systems. In order to do so,
however, we would have to estimate the entire lag structure of
the explanatory equations of the economy. Lack of time and
resources prevented us from carrying out such an ambitious task.
Instead, we had to be satisfied with our simpler approach.
Our next step was to examine the impact of the change in
tax structure upon investment. Investment can be affected in
two ways: first, the degree of riskiness associated with a given
investment project will differ under the two tax systems;
second , the level and timing of the flow of internal funds
is changed when we change tax structure.
As before, our conclusions hinge crucially upon which set
of shifting assumptions we adopt. If we assume that the value-
added tax is not shifted, the level of risk associated with a
given investment project is increased while the expected rate
of return is unchanged. This force tends to make investment
less attractive under a value-added tax than under the profits
tax. Furthermore, if the model of investment behavior advanced
by Meyer and Glauber is valid, investment may be reduced
because of the resulting change in the time path of internal
funds. According to their hypothesis, investment depends
upon the supply of internal funds only in recessionary periods.
The value-added tax, because its base is relatively stable,
results in a smaller flow of funds in a recession than does
the profits tax. The total supply of internal funds over any
given business cycle is the same under both tax systems, how-
ever--only the timing of these flows differ.
If we alter our shifting assumptions in such a way that
each factor absorbs the value-added tax in proportion to its
earnings our conclusions are radically different. In the first
place, the supply of internal funds will be higher in any time
period under the value-added tax than under the profits tax.
Thus investment will be higher in recessions under the former
than under the latter. Secondly, although the degree of risk
associated with any particular investment is higher under the
value-added tax, so is the expected rate of return. Since we do
not know businessmen' s indifference map with respect to yield
and risk, we cannot say how this force will affect behavior.
In the text we have argued and have given some empirical
evidence that, at least in the short-run, businessmen would
not be able to shift the value-added tax. On this basis, we
conclude that investment would decrease--at least initially.
What can we say about the desirability of replacing the
corporate income tax with the value-added tax? Before we can
make any statement it would be wise to point out that our
analysis, in most part, has been carried out under extremely
simplifying assumptions. Furthermore, our analysis encompassed
only a few of the many effects that such a tax substitution
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could have. For example, we have ignored the internatioanl
trade aspects of the tax substitution. It has been argued that
the value-added tax because it can be rebated to exporters,
might improve our balance of payments position. In addition
the tax substitution might increase the efficiency of the
economy. The tax shift would result in a redistribution of
income from those firms whose profits are low (and hence pay
little profits tax) to those firms whose profits are high
(and hence pay the bulk of the profits tax).
Nevertheless the tax substitution would not accomplish
its primary goal--a higher level of investment. Furthermore,
and most important, the change in tax structure would worsen
the distribution of income (from the author)s viewpoint). On
this basis therefore, I feel that we should reject the nroiosal
that the value-added tax be substituted for the corporate
profits tax.
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